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Summary 
 
An understanding of personal preferences and attitudes is crucial in order to design an 
income tax system that people find fair. We have examined, by means of an economic 
experiment, how selfishness, risk preferences and concerns for the equality/efficiency trade-
off relate to preferences for progressive taxation. Our results indicate that there is no direct 
link between selfishness and tax preferences. Nevertheless, the degree of selfishness seems 
to affect the relationship between the other variables. For people who are not very selfish, 
both risk aversion and a concern for efficiency correspond with a positive attitude towards 
progressive taxation. As the degree of selfishness increases, risk preferences and concerns 
for equality and efficiency become less important. At high levels of selfishness, neither 
selfishness, risk preferences nor concerns for equality and efficiency seem to explain 
preferences for progressive taxation. In conclusion, income tax preferences are based on both 
moral and selfish concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
Income taxation is a matter of great importance. It concerns a large amount of people, and it 
has a long history. The general income tax as known and used today was first introduced in 
Europe in 1799, as a means for the British government to fund its war against the French 
forces under Napoleon (hmrc.gov.uk). Income tax in the earliest known form, however, has 
existed as far back as ancient Egypt (Ezzamel, 2012). The issue of income taxation has been 
granted much attention, and many have attempted through numerous approaches to improve 
the income tax design.  
 
Despite the long history of income taxation and the large amount of related research, 
agreement has not been reached regarding what an ideal income tax system is or how it can 
be identified. Today, most countries have implemented some form of personal income tax, 
which varies with marginal personal income tax rates between 10 percent in certain Eastern 
European countries and 59 percent in Aruba (KPMG, 2012). There is great diversity in 
taxation levels and in the degree of redistribution incorporated in the tax system (KPMG, 
2012). In order to analyze the attractiveness of the various systems, we must understand how 
people evaluate different income tax systems and what their evaluation is based on.  
     
In this thesis we will seek to explore the complexity of tax preferences. We aim at 
establishing whether income tax preferences are mainly a matter of self-interest, moral 
considerations or both. Income tax preferences will, in our discussion, be limited to 
redistribution preferences through progressive income taxation. An increased knowledge of 
the motivation behind such preferences will take us one step further in understanding how to 
design an income tax system that people find fair. 
 
1.1 Tax as a trade-off 
Discussions on tax systems appear in the media frequently, particularly in times of elections. 
The debate is usually based upon a common agreement of there being a trade-off in income 
tax between efficiency and equality. A progressive tax system is assumed to promote 
equality. A proportional tax rate increases with income, such that those who earn more pay a 
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higher percentage than those who earn less. This is believed to narrow the gap between the 
net income of the rich and the poor. However, incentives to work more might decrease 
among the rich, as the monetary return from work decreases more and more for each 
additional unit of labor. The result may be that the aggregate work effort decreases. In 
addition, redistribution is thought to be costly in itself due to increased administrative costs. 
The direct cost and the disincentivizing effect are assumed to decrease efficiency, and a 
deadweight loss may occur. 
 
A flat tax rate, on the other hand, is often seen as more efficient and less redistributive. The 
tax cost is proportional, with the same percentage for all regardless of income. Hence, it does 
not give benefits to those worse off, other than them paying a lower absolute amount. This 
type of income tax is therefore not as equality promoting as a progressive tax. It ensures, 
however, the same incentives for everyone to work more, as everyone keeps the same 
proportion of their salary for personal consumption and saving. It is thus seen as a system 
that promotes higher efficiency.  
 
Yet another group of systems is based on regressive tax schedules. Such tax systems involve 
tax rates that diminish with income, and imply redistribution from the less well off to the 
wealthy. 
 
The concerns for efficiency and equality are conflicting, and the optimal balance has proven 
hard to agree upon. Still, the issue of income taxation is more complicated than a simple 
trade-off. There is no way of defining an ideal system without knowing its objective. Who is 
it supposed to be ideal for? How do we determine what is ideal for the different stakeholders, 
i.e. the government, the society and the tax payers? And can we really expect there to be one 
simple answer, one common ideal solution for every situation, every population and every 
nation? Several approaches attempting to answer these questions have been tested. We will 
look into the two main approaches to understanding an income tax system, namely optimal 
tax theory and political economy tax theory. 
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1.2 Approaches to understanding income tax systems 
The first approach is optimal tax theory (Bergson, 1938; Samuelson, 1947; Arrow, 1951). 
This approach defines an optimal income tax system as a system that maximizes the social 
welfare. Social welfare is derived from individual utility, illustrated by a social welfare 
function           where  is social welfare and   is the utility of person n. The social 
welfare function is then used as a point of departure for the development of optimal tax 
rules. The government is assumed to be benevolent and thus implement the welfare-
maximizing solution. 
 
The social welfare function can take many shapes. The classical utilitarians employ a linear 
function, assuming that the only concern is maximizing the total utility. The distribution of 
utility is irrelevant and equality in itself is not a concern (Mill, 1863; Harsanyi, 1955). A 
non-linear welfare function, on the other hand, allows for a preference for equality (Bergson, 
1938; Samuelson, 1947). This means that society can derive more welfare from benefits 
given to a person who currently has little utility than to someone who is better off. A third 
variation of the social welfare function is John Rawls’ maximin approach. According to his 
work (1971), social welfare is anchored to the primary goods
1
, in economics often 
interpreted as utility, of the least well off individual. Social welfare can therefore only be 
increased by increasing this individual’s primary goods. A social welfare function can also 
be elitist, and aim at maximizing the utility of the best-off individual. 
 
The second approach to understanding income tax systems is the political economy tax 
theory. This approach is usually regarded as a means to understanding how a tax system 
occurs and which mechanisms decide the tax system. The theory recognizes political 
election processes as a determinant of the income tax system. The modern democracy grants 
its citizens the right to vote, and thus gives the people the power to indirectly decide what 
kind of income tax to implement. An important implication of this approach is the median 
voter theorem. This theorem states that “a majority rule voting system will select the 
outcome most preferred by the median voter” (Holcombe, 2006, p. 155). In the case of 
income taxation, the median voter will be the voter with an income representing the median 
                                                 
1  “Things that every rational man is presumed to want” (Rawls, 1971, p. 9) 
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income. Consequently, such a political system is assumed to lead to a progressive tax 
schedule if the mean income is above the median income, all other things kept equal. This is 
because more than half of the voters will gain from redistribution as long as the resulting 
efficiency costs are not too large, and their votes will reflect this at elections. Vice versa, the 
median voter theorem implies a flat, or even regressive, system if the mean income is below 
the median. 
 
The two approaches are different in many ways, and they coincide only if the median voter 
has income tax preferences exactly equal to the social welfare function, which is a highly 
theoretical case. They do, however, share a common feature in that in order to be precise, 
they rely on an understanding of the human mind. Both to calculate the total social welfare 
and to predict the behavior of the median voter, knowledge of what humans derive their 
utility from is necessary. This relies on a deeper understanding of what motivates humans. 
 
1.3 Human motivation 
The standard approach in economics is to assume that humans are self-interested. The 
assumption of self-interest implies that humans will always act in their own interest, as their 
utility functions are completely independent of everyone else’s. As Adam Smith states, “It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest” (1776, ch. 2, 2nd paragraph). Self-interest 
involves both a notion of selfishness related to pecuniary payoff and a notion of personal risk 
preferences: People are concerned with how much money they get and with the risk 
involved. The choices such a human makes is the result of a calculation of net payoff to self 
and the pleasure or displeasure the risk inflicts on him. 
 
This approximation of human behavior, known as Homo Economicus, has been vastly 
challenged by research in behavioral economics. Behavioral literature can be divided into 
two separate branches. One branch focuses on irrationality (Camerer, 2003; Ariely, 2008), 
whilst the other emphases the frequent occurrence of non-selfish behavior (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002). The latter includes a concern for other 
people and for society in general. This approach often involves a notion of right and wrong, 
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and it suggests that behavior may depend on ethical and moral attitudes in addition to self-
interest. 
 
One example of such non-selfish behavior is the concern for equality and efficiency. People 
differ in their assessment of the equality/efficiency trade-off and in perceptions of which of 
these concerns will lead to a better and more prosperous society. Some people might be 
focused on equality, asserting a preference for egalitarian outcomes (Fong, 2001; Ackert, 
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2007). Others will prioritize efficiency, emphasizing the 
importance of maximizing the total amount of benefit achieved in society, regardless of 
distribution (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Irrespective of 
stance, this aspect reflects a non-selfish, or moral, concern. 
 
Both the self-interested and the moral concerns can have implications for income tax 
preferences, defined earlier as preferences for redistribution through progressive income 
taxation. Suppose that we limit the factors that may affect income tax preferences to the 
three above-mentioned concerns, namely selfishness, risk preferences and the 
equality/efficiency trade-off. We will then assume the following implications: First of all, 
selfish concerns will, in a risk-free world where there are no efficiency concerns, lead to a 
vote for redistribution in the form of progressive income taxation if personal income is 
below the mean. This is because a person with income below the mean will have to pay less 
than the average rate in income tax, at the same time as he, by assumption, receives the same 
social benefits as everyone else. Secondly, in a risky world with no efficiency concerns, risk 
aversion will lead to a vote for some redistribution. This is because a risk averse person, 
regardless of where he is in the present, will fear a possible move downwards in society in 
the future. By voting for a redistributive tax system, he decreases the negative effect of such 
a move as the decrease in income is lower in a society where the lower share gets tax 
“rebates”. A progressive tax thus acts as an insurance against a worsening of his life 
situation. The moral concerns, in our thesis limited to the equality/efficiency trade-off, also 
have implications. A person who is very concerned with efficiency will be motivated to vote 
for the most efficient income tax system, which is typically considered to be a flat tax rate. A 
person who cares more about equality, will be more inclined to vote in favor of a progressive 
tax. This is because progressive tax schedules are assumed to enhance equality. 
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When combining the effects of selfishness, risk preferences and equality/efficiency concerns, 
it is hard to predict the corresponding relationship with income tax preferences. While some 
effects are assumed to lead to a more positive attitude towards progressive taxation, such as 
risk aversion and equality concerns, other effects work in opposite directions. If, for 
example, a person is risk averse but also very concerned with efficiency, it is difficult to say 
whether he is likely to prefer a flat or a progressive system. The aggregate effect depends on 
the trade-off between selfish and moral concerns. A natural assumption is that the more 
selfish a person is, the more weight will be assigned to the self-interested concerns. In this 
thesis, we will investigate whether this assumption holds, and how the combination of 
different concerns relates to income tax preferences.  
 
1.4 Our contribution 
By observing the choices people make in different choice settings in a lab experiment, we 
measure selfishness, risk preferences and the equality/efficiency trade-off. Further, we study 
how these concerns are associated with income tax preferences, measured by a questionnaire 
conducted in the same lab. Through a systematic approach, we examine which concerns 
come into play when people make judgments of tax systems. If we find relations between the 
three concerns and tax preferences, this will be an important step further in understanding 
these preferences and the motivation behind them. Our results will be a contribution in the 
search for a welfare function that captures people’s true preferences. Our research is 
correlational, meaning that we search for relationships between variables without being able 
to determine causality. The experimental design does not allow us to conclude in which 
direction the effects work. We cannot decide whether for example selfishness affects income 
tax preferences or vice versa, only whether there is a relationship between the two. 
 
Our research question is as follows: 
“Are income tax preferences mainly a reflection of moral or self-interested concerns?” 
 
As for self-interested concerns more specifically, we will investigate whether selfishness is 
negatively related to the level of support for redistribution and whether risk-averse people 
have a higher willingness to redistribute. Regarding moral concerns, we will examine if a 
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stronger preference for efficiency than equality go hand in hand with preferences for a flat 
income tax system. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a literary review, containing a summary of 
relevant research in the field of tax optimization and redistribution preferences. Chapter 3 
presents the design of the research of this thesis, with detailed descriptions of the experiment 
structure, and chapter 4 specifies the practical execution. In chapter 5 the data set is analyzed 
and in chapter 6 it is discussed. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
This chapter summarizes some of the most important findings from research on tax 
preferences and redistribution. We start by presenting the two main approaches in tax theory. 
The first part deals with optimal taxation, and the second with how political processes 
determine tax systems. The third part contains research on which factors motivate humans 
when evaluating redistribution and tax systems. The last part presents empirical findings on 
tax preferences.  
 
2.1 Optimal tax theory 
The basic element in optimal tax theory is the social welfare function. A tax system is 
optimal only if welfare is maximized according to the welfare function chosen as the basis 
for the system. This welfare function can take different shapes and thus capture different 
motifs of taxation and distribution. 
 
The utilitarian social welfare function is probably the social welfare function the most often 
referred to in discussions of optimal taxation. Utilitarianism was the leading principle of 
justice for centuries, and it still serves as a basis for many theories on redistribution. Jeremy 
Bentham (1776) and John Stuart Mill (1863) are considered the founders of modern 
utilitarianism, and many well-known philosophers and economists, such as Henry Sidgwick 
(1901) and John Harsanyi (1955), have advocated this view. Utilitarianism builds on the 
principle of maximizing total utility, and social welfare is maximized when the sum of 
individual utility in society is maximized. The classical utilitarianism assumes linear 
indifference curves in the utility space (see figure 1). This implies that the distribution of 
utility between individuals is irrelevant to the welfare function. The distribution of income, 
however, is of great importance. Maximum social welfare is achieved only when income is 
distributed so that the marginal utility of income is the same for all individuals. As Jeremy 
Bentham (1776, Preface) said, it is “the greatest happiness to the greatest number that is the 
measure of right and wrong”. One looks to the consequences of any action, weighs its 
benefits off with its harms and chooses the solution with the highest net benefit. This 
Benthamite social welfare function is the classical utilitarian   ∑   
 
   , where utilities 
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are unweighted. An income tax system that corresponds with such a welfare function will 
thus only incorporate redistribution from the wealthy to the less well off when the marginal 
utility of income for the poor is higher than for the rich, i.e. individual utility is concave in 
income.  
 
In a paper from 1938, Abram Bergson discussed the notion of the social welfare function and 
introduced the non-linear welfare function                            . An 
illustration can be seen below (figure 2). Samuelson (1947) supported and further developed 
this theory, now commonly known as the Bergson-Samuelson (B-S) social welfare function. 
As opposed to the classical utilitarians, the B-S social welfare function is inequality averse in 
the utility space (Bojer, 2011). One additional unit of utility will lead to a different change in 
total welfare depending on how much utility the person receiving it already has. Social 
welfare thus depends not only on aggregate utility, but also on the distribution of utility. 
Given no change in the total sum of utility, a transfer from a person with high utility to a 
person with low utility will increase social welfare. For an income tax system based on this 
function to be optimal, a progressive tax schedule is typically justified.  
U
A
 
U
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W
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W
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Figure 1. Classical utilitarian social welfare function 
Note: Linear social welfare indifference curves for the 
utility of person A, U
A
, and person B, U
B
.  
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When John Rawls in 1971 published his “A Theory of Justice”, the maximin principle was 
introduced as the main principle of distributive justice. A maximin social welfare function, 
                 , implies that welfare is maximized when the utility of the poorest 
individuals in society is maximized. In a tax system based on this welfare function, a 
progressive income tax schedule must ensure that all redistribution is channeled towards the 
least well off. For an illustration of this social welfare function, see figure 3. At the very 
opposite end of the scale, we find the maximax welfare function in the spirit of the German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (Hurka, 2007). This is an elitist welfare function that 
maximizes the maximum possible result:                 . The alternative with the 
superior “best case” outcome is chosen, even if this would be at the expense of the expected 
outcome or the “worst case” outcome. Such a welfare function requires a regressive tax 
system that redistributes to the individuals with the highest possible maximum utility. An 
extreme implication of this function is that one person gets everything. 
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Figure 2. Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function 
Note: Convex social welfare indifference curves for the utility 
of person A, U
A
, and person B, U
B
. 
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2.2 Political economy tax models 
Political economy tax models aim at explaining how voting determines the tax system. In a 
democratic political economy, it is the government that decides on what tax policies to 
implement. The government is made up of political parties that have sufficient support 
among the public. Whether or not a political party receives the necessary support depends on 
the preferences of the voters.  This link between voter preferences and actual tax policies can 
be described by the median voter theorem (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957). 
 
To illustrate the median voter theorem, imagine a case where an election between two major 
parties is held. The voters will choose the party whose policies are closest to their preferred 
policy. Hence the party closest to the preferences of the median voter will get his vote. Since 
this party is also necessarily closest to the preferences of more than half of the voters, it will 
U
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U
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W
1
 
W
2
 
W
3
 
Figure 3. Maximin social welfare function 
Note: L-shaped social welfare indifference curves for the 
utility of person A, U
A
, and person B, U
B
. 
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win the election. The party that earns the vote of the median voter will therefore always be 
the winning party. This is called the weak form of the median voter theorem (Congleton, 
2002). 
 
There is also a strong form of the theorem, which states that the median voter’s exact 
preferences will be realized. This relies on the parties being free to choose their own policy 
position. If so, they will both try to win the median voter by moving their policy positions 
closer and closer to his preferences. The policy positions will converge towards the median 
until they coincide and both parties get practically the same number of votes. Assuming that 
the winning party delivers as promised, the median voter will thus get his exact preferred 
policy, regardless of who wins the election.  
 
Some assumptions are necessary for the median voter theorem to hold (Black, 1948). The 
theorem requires that all election alternatives can be placed along a one-dimensional 
spectrum. In addition, voter preferences must be single-peaked, which means that voters 
have one preferred outcome and they will choose the alternative that is closest to this 
outcome. Voters must also always vote for their true preference. Finally, elections must be 
based on majority election systems. 
 
Although these assumptions are strict, the theorem can to some extent explain how actual tax 
systems are determined. It can have implications for how the political parties make up their 
tax policies and which party wins the election. Hotelling noticed this tendency and remarked 
already in his 1929 article “Stability in Competition” that political platforms seemed to 
converge during times of elections. The theorem implies for example that a left-wing party 
will be inclined to moderate its income tax progressivity if it knows that the median voter 
prefers a flatter system. This is because such moderation will increase its chances of 
winning. The same inclination to moderate their policy will be seen in a right-wing party. 
The realized income tax policy will assumably be close to the preferences of the median 
voter. 
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2.3 What motivates humans? 
Both in identifying the optimal income taxation and in comprehending the mechanisms 
behind the actual income taxation, an understanding of the factors that motivate human 
behavior is necessary. Only with this understanding can optimal tax theory and political 
economy tax models be precise. Thus we need to understand human motivation to create an 
income tax system that is ideal within the restriction of being politically realizable.  
 
Among others, Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and 
Rabin (2002) have developed models that attempt to predict and explain how humans behave 
in redistributional situations. The hope is “that the insights into the nature of nonself-
interested behavior gleaned from experiments can eventually be applied to a variety of 
economic settings, such as (...) attitudes toward different tax schemes” (Charness and Rabin, 
2002, p. 817). In order for this to happen, “the interaction between the distribution of 
preferences and the economic environment deserves more attention in future research.” (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999, p. 856). The usage of the optimal tax theory and the political economy 
tax models must therefore start with an exploration of the selfish and non-selfish motives 
that determine individual income tax preferences. 
 
2.3.1 Self-interest motivations 
Although the pure Homo Economicus has been challenged as a proxy for human behavior, 
self-interest is still an important element in modern research on human behavior. There is a 
large group of researchers who base their models on self-interest (Meltzer and Richard, 
1981; Sears and Funk, 1991) and most believe that self-interest is at least one of the main 
factors when evaluating redistribution and tax systems. In theories of tax preferences, self-
interest mainly manifests itself in two ways: payoff and social insurance. 
 
Selfishness 
Theoretical work 
The payoff aspect of self-interest, here called selfishness, relates to pecuniary payoff and the 
idea that people will be positive towards tax systems that maximize their own after-tax 
income. According to Hobbes, humans are motivated first and foremost by selfishness (in 
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Mansbridge, 1990). In a similar manner, Lord Macaulay (1829) states that acting from 
selfishness is the only proposition respecting human nature that is absolutely and universally 
true. Meltzer and Richard (1981) assume exclusively selfish motivation and develop a model 
based on the following premise: All individuals are fully informed, utility-maximizing 
individuals who make rational choices based on self-interest. Meltzer and Richard undertake 
the political economy approach and argue that this way, voters with low income favor higher 
tax schedules and more redistribution, while voters with higher income prefer lower taxes 
and less redistribution. 
 
 Empirical work 
Selfishness as a motivation is supported by several empirical studies. Countless dictator 
game experiments have established that humans are partly driven by selfishness in economic 
choice situations (for a review, see Engel, 2011). In addition, research has been conducted on 
the importance of selfishness when considering redistribution on a societal level. In 2000, 
Ravaillon and Lokshin conducted a survey gathering opinions about redistribution in Russia. 
The results showed that support for redistribution was higher among the poor than among 
the well off. This is coherent with the notion of selfishness in redistribution, as the poor will 
gain from it, while the rich will suffer the loss. Corneo and Grüner (2002) found supporting 
evidence from an international survey where they tested the explanatory power of net 
pecuniary gain on preferences for redistribution. They found that a belief in a personal gain 
from redistribution had a positive and highly significant impact and strong explanatory 
power on willingness to redistribute. Similarly, Heinemann and Hennighausen (2010) 
analyzed data material from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and found that 
an individual’s preferences for progressive taxation are partly determined by selfish 
concerns. 
 
The papers above all indicate that selfishness matters when making redistributional choices. 
Pecuniary payoff appears to constitute a non-negligible part of tax preferences and should 
thus be incorporated into any model of tax preferences. The papers do not, however, exclude 
that other concerns matter. Using calculations on net pecuniary payoff as the only motivation 
for human behavior might be practical. However, this is not realistic in all cases and may not 
always be sufficient to make precise predictions. 
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Risk 
A second implication of self-interest relates to taxation as a means of social insurance. This 
implication is derived from the fact that progressive tax systems entail redistribution within 
individuals, from fortunate to unfortunate personal states. This redistribution works as an 
insurance that guarantees a certain level of welfare regardless of life situation. This way, tax 
preferences are closely related to risk preferences: A risk averse person will be more in favor 
of progressivity than a risk neutral or risk seeking person. 
 
Theoretical work 
Theoretical work on risk and taxation has generally aimed at examining the societal effects 
of taxation as social insurance. Diamond, Helms and Mirrlees (1978) study the importance 
of social insurance benefits in simple taxation cases by using Cobb-Douglas utility functions. 
In the simple economies they analyze, individuals wish to maximize the expected value of a 
utility function. Utility is derived from consumption in two periods, period one and period 
two. In period two, the ability to work and earn an income is uncertain. The authors claim 
that a risk averse person will want to insure himself against the risk related to labor and 
consumption in period two. This insurance can be provided by the government through tax 
and social insurance systems. Varian (1980) identifies an optimal tax that is a trade-off 
between efficiency, equity and insurance. Insurance, in this regard, means reducing the 
variance of personal income and thus decreasing the risk. The need for social insurance is 
derived from the assumption that income contains a random component, which he assumes 
to be exogenous luck. Varian suspects that “widespread political support of many 
redistributive programs rests more with the social insurance aspect of the program than with 
altruistic consideration involving social welfare” (Varian, 1980, p. 51). 
 
Empirical work 
The importance of the concern for risk has also been tested empirically. Hörisch (2008) 
recorded distribution choices in three situations: one dictator game measuring social 
preferences, one risk game and one Veil Of Ignorance (VOI) game. VOI is a state where the 
participant decides on a distribution of wealth between two accounts, without knowing 
which one will be assigned to himself and which one will be assigned to another participant. 
If the VOI choice coincided with the risk choice, the participant was only concerned with the 
risk aspect of the VOI, and not with the social aspect. If the VOI choice coincided with the 
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risk-free dictator choice, only social preferences mattered. Hörisch could thus separate the 
effect of social preferences and risk preferences when behind the VOI. She found that men’s 
behavior behind the VOI was influenced in large part by a wish to insure themselves against 
risk. Women were motivated both by risk and by social preferences.  
 
In his paper on motivations for redistribution, Bjerk (2011) similarly found that risk made 
the subjects modify their behavior. Individuals moving from an environment with certainty 
regarding their place in the earnings distribution to one with uncertainty changed their 
redistribution choices dramatically. In the certainty environment, the vast majority seemed to 
be motivated by their own payoff, while subjects in the uncertainty environment displayed a 
need to insure themselves against a low income. 
 
The findings above are supported by Carlsson, Gupta and Johansson-Stenman (2003), who 
had their subjects choose between hypothetical societies with different income distributions, 
without knowing their own place. They observed that students both in India and in Sweden 
are mostly risk-averse and prefer societies with more equal incomes. 
 
2.3.2 Moral concerns 
 Theoretical work 
Theorists have disagreed on whether self-interest can adequately explain human behavior. 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
According to Henrich et al. (2001, p. 73), “one problem appears to lie in economists’ 
canonical assumption that individuals are entirely self-interested”. Many models therefore 
incorporate a possibility for people to care about persons other than themselves. As people 
do not necessarily behave like the classical Homo Economicus, concerns for other people, 
for society and for general fairness, are hypothesized to be among the motivational factors 
that explain behavior. We have named this group of preferences “moral concerns”. Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2002) discuss earlier work on redistributive preferences and find strong 
indications of people exhibiting social preferences. They argue that without taking social 
preferences into account, it is not possible to understand fundamental issues in economics, 
like competition, collaboration and material incentives. They state that “People differ not 
only in their tastes for chocolate and bananas but also along a more fundamental dimension” 
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(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C30). While some behave in a purely self-interested manner, 
others “care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents” 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C1). 
 
 Empirical work 
There is an extensive empirical literature on observed deviations from Homo Economicus. 
Singhal (2008) analyzed survey data from seven OECD countries and found that the 
majority of the respondents preferred progressive taxation. The differences in preferences 
between different income levels were very small. From this, she concluded on “a limited role 
for self-interest in the determination of preferences for redistribution” (Singhal, 2008, p. 17). 
Heinemann and Hennighausen’s (2010) analysis of the German General Social Survey 
(ALLBUS) found that people do not necessarily prefer the tax progressivity (or non-
progressivity) that benefits themselves. Fairness preferences, which were measured as 
agreement with all individuals having a “decent income even without achievement”, 
determined a significant part of individual tax preferences (Heinemann and Hennighausen, 
2010, p. 8). Hudson and Jones (2002) looked to the role of moral concerns in terms of public 
interest, and found that moral concerns had substantial influence on policy preferences. They 
tested not only tax preferences, but also tax-financed spending on health and education. For 
both, the results indicate a greater role for public interest than self-interest.  
 
The empirical evidence thus suggests that moral concerns should be included in the 
understanding of tax preferences. When investigating moral concerns, we will focus on the 
equality/efficiency trade-off. We therefore first provide an overview of empirical work on 
the equality/efficiency trade-off in general redistribution choices and thereafter in income tax 
settings. Further, we will examine empirical findings that emphasize the heterogeneity in 
how people evaluate this trade-off. We will also look at theories that try to explain this 
observed heterogeneity. 
  
Equality-Efficiency 
In the same way as we observe different conceptions and beliefs about the 
equality/efficiency trade-off at a societal level, it is reasonable to assume that individuals 
also have personal preferences related to this trade-off (Bittker, 1979; Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2004). How the concerns for equality and efficiency are weighted against each other 
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is individual, and there is great heterogeneity among people (Mitchell et al, 1993). A person 
who is motivated by moral concerns when evaluating tax systems will be more or less 
positive to redistribution depending on whether he or she prioritizes equality or efficiency.  
 
 Empirical work on general redistribution 
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted in order to investigate this trade-off. The 
research has involved different redistributional choice situations and has often been 
conducted as lab experiments. Charness and Rabin (2002) ran an experiment consisting of a 
multitude of simple games, each designed to identify specific effects. Their results showed 
that the subjects had a strong preference for efficiency when choosing how to redistribute, 
and equality was not a major issue. In a similar manner, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 
tested through an experiment of games the relative importance of inequality aversion and 
efficiency concerns, as well as selfishness and the maximin principle. They found that 
efficiency concerns and selfishness could explain most of the data. Pure inequality aversion, 
on the other hand, appeared to be of no importance to redistributional preferences, although 
maximin seemed to be a concern. 
 
 Empirical work on taxation 
Some of the empirical research on equality/efficiency has specifically examined the trade-off 
in a tax setting. Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2007) tested the importance of various 
social preferences when voting for alternative tax structures. They conducted an experiment 
where subjects were randomly assigned an income, which was their payment for 
participating, and were then informed of the average income within the group. Next, the 
participants were to cast a vote for either a lump-sum (non-redistributive) tax or a 
progressive (redistributive) tax which came at a cost. The data showed that the subjects were 
clearly concerned with inequality and thus chose a redistributive tax scheme. The inequality 
aversion decreased, however, as the deadweight loss resulting from the cost of progressive 
taxation increased. These results indicate that equality, as well as efficiency, may be 
important concerns for many people, and that the two are traded off against each other.  
 
 Empirical work on heterogeneity 
It seems clear that while some individuals prioritize efficiency, equality is the preference of 
others. Research has confirmed this impression of heterogeneity. Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
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found that almost half of the subjects in their study showed redistribution preferences that 
were either perfect substitutes, perfectly selfish or Leontief. Perfect substitutes means giving 
away all income when the price of giving is less than one, and keeping everything when the 
price of giving is greater than one. This illustrates efficiency concerns in income 
distributions. Leontief means dividing the surplus equally, and is thus an expression of 
equality preferences. Similarly, Fisman, Kariv and Markovits (2007) performed an 
experiment with a three-person dictator game (the same as the social game we describe later 
in this paper) to measure the equality/efficiency trade-off in allocations to other participants. 
They found that “preferences for giving are very heterogeneous, ranging from perfect 
substitutes to Leontief” (Fisman, Kariv and Markovits, 2007, p. 2). 
 
 Theoretical work on heterogeneity 
Several theories have been developed on why there is such heterogeneity in the evaluation of 
this trade-off. One of these theories is the Value-Guided Perspective, a descriptive theory 
introduced by Mitchell et al (1993). It is based on the idea of McClosky and Zaller (1984), 
stating that “Equality is an important organizing principle in liberal and social democratic 
ideology, as are efficiency and economic liberty in conservative and laissez-faire ideology“ 
(Mitchell et al., 1993, p. 629). People, in the course of socialization, “acquire relatively 
stable preferences for equality and efficiency that serve cognitive appraisal functions” 
(Mitchell et al, 1993, p. 629). This principle thus says that the political view and ideology 
you identify yourself with will decide which preferences you have for equality versus 
efficiency. Almås et al. (2010) studied how fairness considerations and the 
equality/efficiency assessment develop during adolescence. They observe a large decrease in 
strict egalitarian fairness and an increase in the importance of meritocratic fairness. In other 
words, going through adolescence seems to shift fairness views away from believing that 
everyone should get the same benefits regardless of effort, to that everyone should get 
benefits corresponding to their achievements. They argue that this development is a result of 
both cognitive maturation and social experiences.  
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2.4 Tax preferences 
In the same way as there is heterogeneity in the evaluation of the equality/efficiency trade-
off, there are differing opinions on what an optimal income tax system looks like. It has long 
been assumed that there is wide support for redistribution, and the debate has been limited to 
the degree of progressivity (Atkinson, 1973; Slemrod, 1990). During the 1980s, however, 
there was a rising interest in flat tax schedules (Roberts, Hite and Bradley, 1994), and in the 
1990s, several countries, mainly in Eastern Europe, moved towards a flattening of their 
income tax systems (Keen, Kim and Varsano, 2006). Today, research reveals very varying 
preferences regarding income tax schedules (Roberts, Hite and Bradley, 1994). Empirical 
studies, mainly in the form of surveys, have been undertaken with the aim of mapping 
income tax preferences. The main focus has been the degree of redistribution within the 
income tax system. 
  
Singhal (2008) investigated preferences for redistribution in seven OECD countries. She 
found that “the overall variation in preferred progressivity is substantial” (Singhal, 2008, 
Abstract). 38.0 percent of the respondents reported preferred schedules that were strictly 
progressive (average tax rates increased over each income interval), and a further 35.4 
percent reported schedules that were weakly progressive. 7.2 percent of the respondents 
preferred flat schedules, and only 2.1 percent and 0.8 percent of the respondents reported a 
preference for systems that were weakly regressive or strictly regressive, respectively. Using 
survey data from several European countries, Fatica (2011) found that the majority of the 
respondents preferred a progressive system. Regressive tax schedules, on the other hand, had 
very limited support. In addition, nearly 80 percent of the respondents answered in favor of a 
progressive system in a large survey conducted in Germany (Heinemann and Hennighausen, 
2010). In France, Boarini and Le Clainche (2009) did not explicitly investigate income tax 
preferences, but rather general redistribution in society. They found that 87 percent 
supported redistribution, based on data from the survey “Opinions about Welfare State”. The 
indicator of redistribution preferences was built on the basis of three questions: Who should 
stand by have-not individuals, who should mostly battle with poverty and who should be 
made responsible for not self-dependent people: public institutions or individuals and private 
foundations. 
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Although there seems to be general agreement on the desirability of a progressive income tax 
schedule, there is also heterogeneity in the survey responses. This has been further 
investigated by several researchers, whose focus has been the variation in preferences for 
progressivity among different countries. Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) examined 
redistribution preferences in the USA, and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004) compared redistribution preferences in the USA to redistribution preferences 
in Europe. They observed that support for redistribution through progressive taxation was 
substantially lower in the USA than in Europe (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), and they 
explain this mainly by different perceptions of fair and unfair inequality and different views 
on the possibilities of social mobility. These views are thought to be a result of historical and 
cultural differences. Corneo and Grüner (2002) support these findings. In their sample 
consisting of people of different nationalities, preferences for redistribution were lowest in 
the USA and highest in Norway. 
  
As indicated above, some of the heterogeneity in income tax preferences can be explained by 
differences between countries. Nevertheless, we observe that people differ in their 
preferences for income taxation also within countries. We therefore hypothesize that these 
differences can be partly explained by variations in selfish and moral concerns. This is what 
we investigate in our research. 
 30 
3. Experiment design 
This chapter describes the methodology of the research. The first section gives the main 
outline and objective of the experiment followed by an illustration of the research model and 
the corresponding hypotheses. The following sections give detailed descriptions of the game 
part and the questionnaire part of the experiment, as well as of the corresponding variables. 
 
3.1 Main outline 
The data for this research were gathered by means of an experiment, which was part of a 
larger research project run by Shachar Kariv at UC Berkeley. The experiment consisted of 
four different games and a questionnaire. The games asked the respondents to make choices 
in 200 decision problems regarding distribution of income, 50 in each game. One of the 50 
decisions per game was randomly chosen to be carried out for payoff. Because of this, each 
decision could potentially determine the net pecuniary payoff for the participant and should 
therefore prompt considerations similar to real-life distribution situations. The payments 
were not revealed until the end of the experiment. Each game was designed so as to measure 
a specific distributional motivation. The games were supplemented by a questionnaire 
consisting of questions reflecting the respondents’ preferences regarding tax progressivity 
and redistribution. The details of the game designs and the questionnaire are explained 
shortly. 
 
For each game we obtained observations that constitute one of the independent variables of 
our research. The tax preferences from the questionnaire constitute the dependent variable. 
The analysis of the data searches for associations between the dependent and the 
independent variables without determining causality. More details of the analysis can be 
found in the analysis chapter of this paper. 
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3.2 Research model and hypotheses 
The research model employed can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
Our research has the following main hypotheses: 
H1:    For the rich, tax attitudes towards redistribution relate negatively to 
selfishness 
H2:   Tax attitudes towards redistribution relate positively to risk aversion 
H3:    Tax attitudes towards redistribution relate negatively to efficiency preferences 
 
Note that for the purpose of our analysis, we impose the premise that all participants in the 
experiment expect to be rich, i.e. earn above the mean national income over their lifespan. 
From this follows that they assume to be less well off with a progressive income tax than 
Figure 4. Research model 
Note: The research model illustrates the three hypotheses, which state that 
both self-interested concerns and moral concerns relate to tax preferences. 
Note the distinction between self-interest, defined as all self-regarding 
concerns, and selfishness, which is solely a concern for pecuniary payoff. 
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with a flat system. We impose this premise on the analysis as all the participants are 
university students and have a relatively high expected future income. Research shows that 
higher education leads to a higher lifespan income, and that lifespan income on average 
increases with three percent per year of higher education (Kirkebøen, 2010). As only a third 
of all inhabitants in Norway pursue higher education (SSB, 2010), it is natural to assume that 
the participants in the experiment expect a lifetime income above the national mean. We 
investigate this premise further as part of the analysis.  
 
3.3 Detailed description 
3.3.1 Games 
The first part of the experiment consists of four different games, all of which ask the 
respondents to decide on an allocation of tokens between two accounts, x and y. The tokens 
are each worth a given amount of NOK (see appendix 1). The participants are informed of 
the conversion rate before the games are commenced. The two accounts correspond to the x 
and y axis on a two-dimensional graph, see figure 5. The participants must choose each 
allocation as a point on a line that represents all possible allocations. The line is chosen 
randomly by a computer from a set of lines which all must intersect one of the axes at 50 or 
more tokens, and not exceed 100 or be lower than 1 on any of the axes. For example, a 
straight line that intersects at 100 on both axes represents a situation where tokens can be 
transferred directly from the x account to the y account without any cost and the total amount 
is 100 tokens regardless of the split. If the line, however, intersects the x axis at 100 and the y 
axis at 30, the total amount will decrease as more tokens are allocated to the y account. This 
is a situation where transfers from the x account to the y account come at a cost. Vice versa, 
transfers from y to x yield a surplus. 
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All four games are standard designs in experimental economics. Experiments of the same 
structure, consisting of similar games, instructions and execution have been arranged 
successfully several times (Fisman, Kariv and Markovits, 2007; Choi et al, 2007). In our 
analysis, we will only use data from three of the games, so only these three games will be 
described carefully in the section that follows. We will nonetheless provide a brief 
description of the fourth game, the moral game. 
 
SELFISH 
Decision scenario  
The selfishness game is a standard dictator game. Each person is linked with a random, 
anonymous other person. The dictator is given a line on which to choose an allocation 
between himself and the other person, the recipient. The recipient is passive and receives 
whatever the dictator has allocated to him. As all participants will play the role of the 
dictator, they will also be the passive recipients of another participant’s allocation. This 
Figure 5. Choice situation 
Note: The graph depicts the choice space for 
allocations in the four games, with an example of 
a budget line from x=40 to y=90 and an allocation 
of x=14 and y=57.  
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linking is completely independent of the former. The instructions handed to the participants 
are found in appendix 2. 
                     
Variable 
The observations from the selfishness game are used to calculate the SELFISH variable, 
which reflects the participants’ level of selfishness. We define the variable as the average 
share of the total amount of tokens taken to oneself. As the dictator receives the y account, 
the variable SELFISH is found by calculating the mean of y/(x+y) for all decision choices of 
each participant. A completely selfish person will only be concerned with getting as much as 
possible and will thus consistently choose to take all the tokens for himself. He will do so by 
allocating the maximum to the y account. Consequently, he will not allocate anything to the 
x account and the variable SELFISH will have a value of 1, which is the highest possible 
value. The less selfish a person is, the smaller will the SELFISH variable be. As account x 
and y on average will be equal, a completely non-selfish person will, on average, divide the 
tokens equally between the accounts. We therefore assume that the smallest plausible value 
of SELFISH is ½, or 0.5. 
 
RISK 
Decision scenario 
In the risk game, the participants’ decisions only affect themselves. Each participant 
allocates to the x and y account, and one of these accounts will randomly and with equal 
probability be chosen as payment. The other tokens will be lost. The participant instructions 
can be found in appendix 3. 
 
Variable 
The observations from the risk game are used to calculate the variable RISK, which is to 
reflect each participant’s degree of risk aversion. The variable is defined as the individual 
mean of the shares of the total allocated amount of tokens that is put in the cheaper asset. 
The cheaper asset is the asset with the highest maximum value, such that reducing that 
account with one token will lead to an increase of less than one in the other account. The 
calculation is x/(x+y) if x is the cheaper asset, and y/(x+y) if y is the cheaper. A completely 
risk averse person will want to eliminate all of the risk involved in choosing an allocation, no 
matter the cost. This is achieved only when the tokens are allocated equally between the x 
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and y account. He will do so because the expected utility from getting tokens is less than the 
displeasure of experiencing risk up until the point where there is no more risk. The extreme 
is thus a person who chooses an allocation of 1-1 instead of a 0-100 allocation, despite the 
considerable decrease in expected outcome. As this person will always choose an equal split, 
RISK will be ½, or 0.5. A person who is risk neutral does not experience any displeasure 
from risk and is therefore indifferent between different allocations as long as the expected 
outcome stays the same. He will always choose the option that maximizes the expected 
amount of tokens. As the accounts have a 50/50 probability and practically all the budget 
lines involve a trade that is not 1-to-1 between tokens to the x and y account, the maximum 
expected amount will only be achieved by choosing a corner solution. The risk neutral 
person will thus consistently choose to allocate everything to the y account if the y account 
has a higher maximum value than the x account, and vice versa. The RISK variable will then 
be 1. 
 
EFFICIENCY 
Decision scenario 
The game measuring equality/efficiency preferences, named the social game, is a dictator 
game with an impartial spectator. In this game, the dictator will make decisions on behalf of 
two other participants, and he will not be affected by the decisions himself. The dictator will 
randomly be linked to the two other participants, and they will all remain anonymous. These 
two passive persons will be the receivers, one of the x account and one of the y account. As 
all participants are given the role of dictator, they will also be one of the recipients in two 
other persons’ allocation choices. The three situations are completely independent. The 
instructions for this game are in appendix 4. 
 
Variable 
The observations from the social game are used to obtain a measure of the concern for 
efficiency in a situation where efficiency comes at the cost of reduced equality and vice 
versa. The variable EFFICIENCY is calculated as the individual mean share of the total 
amount of tokens the subject puts in the cheaper asset. The calculation is x/(x+y) if x is the 
cheaper asset, and y/(x+y) if y is the cheaper. A person who is only concerned with 
efficiency will always aim at maximizing the total amount of tokens, as this is most efficient. 
He will not care whether the split is equal or if one of the two gets everything while the other 
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gets nothing. Since one of the assets in our games is cheaper than the other, the efficient 
allocation is to put as much as possible in the account with the highest maximum. This is, 
apart from in the very rare symmetric budget line, a corner solution with the coordinates 
(max x, 0) or (0, max y). The mean share allocated to the account with the highest maximum 
should therefore equal 1. If a subject, on the other hand, is only concerned with equality, he 
will want to allocate an equal amount of tokens to the x and y account. The budget line 
determines the size of the efficiency loss associated with an equal split, but the subject does 
not care about efficiency and will therefore be consistent in choosing an evenly split 
allocation. The EFFICIENCY variable will then be ½, or 0.5. 
 
MORAL 
This game measures social preferences, defined as preferences behind Rawls’ Veil of 
Ignorance. The participants are, as dictators, to make an allocation between the two 
accounts. One of the accounts is randomly chosen for the dictator, while another participant 
receives the other account. The results from this game are not included in our analysis, and 
therefore not discussed in further detail. 
 
3.3.2 Questionnaire 
We developed a questionnaire to survey people’s preferences for redistributive tax systems 
and to collect demographic background information. The details can be found in appendix 5. 
The questions used to map income tax preferences are mainly derived from Almås, Cappelen 
and Tungodden (2013), from the European Social Study of 2008/2009 as they appear in 
Fatica (2011) and from Singhal (2008). Some of the questions have been slightly adjusted 
and rephrased to fit our purpose. 
 
The part of the questionnaire that relates to tax preferences consists of five items. The first 
four are statements to which the participants have to answer whether they “disagree 
completely”, “disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “agree” or “agree completely”. A 
Likert scale of five has been chosen to give the participants the possibility of a neutral 
answer, and to simplify the process by not providing too many alternatives. 
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The first two items, “A society should aim at equalizing incomes” and “In the present 
situation in Norway, we should do more to equalize incomes” are to reflect a general attitude 
towards equality and the society’s responsibility to equalize incomes. These questions, we 
believe, will capture redistributive preferences that are not necessarily linked to the tax 
system. The phrasing is unchanged from Almås, Cappelen and Tungodden (2013). The next 
two items, “Imagine two people, one earning twice as much as the other: The person 
earning twice as much should pay more than double of the other in tax” and “The 
government should spend more of the tax revenues on social services and benefits targeting 
the poor than the rich”, measure preferences for progressivity in tax payments and in tax 
spending, respectively. Here, the aim is to capture a more specific preference for 
redistribution with the income tax system as the means. These two items are derived from 
the questions that Fatica (2011) employs in her research. 
 
The last item is a concrete, numerical question. It asks “What total amount of tax per year, if 
any at all, should in your opinion be paid by a person earning NOK 200,000 a year? By 
taxes, we mean all personal income taxes. Indicate your answers in NOK”. The participant is 
free to state any value. Then we repeat the question three times, each time by doubling the 
yearly earnings, so that the person is earning NOK 400,000, NOK 800,000 and NOK 
1,600,000. Singhal (2008) uses this method in her research, and she argues that concrete, 
numerical questions provide the most accurate answers. With this question, we manage to 
quantify the preferred degree of progressivity or regressivity. 
 
Variables measuring income tax preferences 
The two groups of income tax preference items in the survey, namely the abstract and the 
numerical, have been used to create two different variables measuring income tax 
preferences. Analyses are conducted using either as the dependent variable. 
 
TATR 
The first four questions have been combined to create a variable named TATR (Tax attitudes 
towards redistribution). This dependent variable captures the respondents’ general attitude 
towards redistribution and progressive income taxation. The variable is created by simply 
adding the scores on the first four questions for each respondent. Then we subtract 4 and 
divide by 16, so that each respondent can be placed on a scale from 0 to 1. A TATR value of 
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1 represents an exclusively positive attitude towards redistribution, while a score of 0 
represents a negative attitude. Let us consider an example: A respondent answers “Agree” 
(4) to the first question and “Disagree” (2) to the second. He then replies “Neither agree nor 
disagree” (3) to the third question and “Agree completely” (5) to the fourth question. This 
gives him a TATR value of 0.625, as (14-4)/16=0.625. A TATR value of 0.625 can be 
considered in favor of redistribution, but the preference is not very strong. 
 
TATR2 
The second dependent variable measuring redistribution preferences is named TATR2. This 
variable captures the respondents’ preferred degree of progressivity or regressivity in the tax 
system. The variable is based on the responses to the fifth question. This is the question 
where respondents are asked to “design” their own tax system by indicating how much tax a 
person earning different amounts of NOK should pay. To construct the variable, we calculate 
the tax rate (percentage share) corresponding to each tax payment. Then we subtract the tax 
rate corresponding to the lowest income from the tax rate corresponding to the highest 
income. This difference in tax rate represents the preferred progressivity and constitutes 
TATR2. 
 
Preliminary analyses show that TATR2 does not generate any interesting results, see 
appendix 6. We believe that this measure does not capture people’s true redistribution 
preferences, as the task of designing a tax system does not seem to be well understood. In 
order to design a tax system that captures the preferred degree of progressivity, a certain 
understanding of calculation and percentages is required. It may seem that such an 
understanding is lacking in our sample. For further purpose, we have therefore chosen to 
focus solely on TATR as our measure of redistribution preferences. 
 
Background variables 
Finally, the questionnaire collects background data on the participant’s gender, age and 
political view. It also asks the participants to estimate their total expenditures the previous 
year and total gross income of their parents. This information makes up the background 
variables. 
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GENDER 
The variable GENDER reflects the participants’ gender. It is constructed as a dummy 
variable, where the value of 0 represents male and 1 represents female. 
 
AGE 
The respondents of the survey are asked to state their age. The variable AGE takes this 
value.  
 
PARENTALINCOME 
This variable contains information on the respondents’ financial background, represented by 
the yearly gross income of their parents. The respondents are asked to estimate their parents’ 
gross income by choosing among five different income brackets. Each bracket is an interval 
of NOK 250,000, with the lowest bracket being 0-250,000 and the highest >1,500,000. The 
brackets are assigned a score corresponding to the center value of each bracket, denoted in 
thousand NOK. An exception is the top bracket, which is given a score of two million, 
denoted in thousand NOK.  
 
EXPENDITURES 
The respondents are also asked to estimate their expenditures the previous calendar year. 
There are no brackets, so the respondents are free to state any amount. The variable 
EXPENDITURES takes this amount, denoted in thousand NOK. 
 
POLITICALVIEW 
Finally, the respondents have to reply to a question that measures their political view. They 
are asked to answer where they place themselves on a scale of seven, from “Very left wing” 
to “Very right wing”. For the analysis, each alternative is assigned a score, where 1 
represents “Very left wing” and 7 represents “Very right wing”. The alternative in the 
middle, “Moderate”, has the score of 4.  
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4. Execution 
This chapter describes the details of the execution, including a description of the sample. 
 
4.1 Recruitment 
The experiment was held on April 11, 2013. It was conducted at the University of Bergen 
(UiB), and the participants were 135 students from UiB. Each experiment session was 
overbooked by 12 students, which ensured full sessions. 33-34 students participated in each 
session and there were four sessions in total. The students were recruited through stands at 
different university faculties and they were informed about the show-up payment of 100 
NOK. Further, they were informed about the possibility of earning additional payments 
through the experiment. 
 
4.2 Sample 
The sampling method used is convenience sampling. The participants were recruited because 
of their proximity and convenient accessibility, and the sample cannot be assumed to be 
representative of the general population. The participants were aged 19 to 48 years, but the 
majority was in their early twenties and the average age was 23 years. In total, there were 72 
male and 63 female participants. 
 
The average income of the participants’ parents is represented by the center income bracket, 
750,000-1,000,000, and this is also the median observation. Such a household income 
corresponds approximately to the national average (SSB, 2013). The average expenditure of 
the participants the previous year is 123,000. Although responses range from 0 to 400,000, 
58 percent of the respondents reported expenditures in the interval 100,000 to 200,000. This 
can be considered common, as the average for students is 140,000 (SSB, 2006). One person 
reported expenditures of 3,000,000. A possible explanation is that he has bought an 
apartment, which makes these expenditures non-representative for the respondent’s normal 
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consumption. This response was therefore removed from the sample. The removal of this 
observation does not change the results of the analysis.  
  
Regarding the political view of the participants, the mean score was 3.89 on a scale from 1 to 
7 where 1 represents “Very left wing” and 7 represents “Very right wing”. The mean is thus 
slightly to the left of the center. The most common observation, however, is “Slightly right 
wing”, which was the response indicated by 36 of the respondents. None of the participants 
indicated that they were “Very right wing”, while two participants indicated “Very left 
wing”. The median response was “Moderate”, and the distribution is close to the shape of a 
bell curve. Further information on the participants can be found as appendix 7. 
  
4.3 Location and time spent 
The experiment took place in two computer rooms at UiB. The computers were stationed at 
an arm’s length distance and separated by partition walls. There was a random assignment of 
seating through blindly picking a numbered ball from a basket. Participants were not allowed 
to leave and return to the room during the experiment. They could, however, withdraw at any 
time without payment. None of the participants took advantage of this opportunity. 
 
The experiment was divided into two parts. The first part consisted of the four different 
games, while the second part was the questionnaire. In total, each session lasted for 
approximately 100 minutes. On average, the participants spent four seconds on each of the 
200 decisions. 
 
4.4 Information in advance 
After all the participants had found their assigned computer, they were welcomed by the 
experiment leader and informed about the rules of conduct. Further, they were ensured full 
anonymity. Finally, the experiment leader explained the general design of the games and 
gave instructions to the participants. The script can be found as appendix 8. The general 
instructions and rules were also to be found in a folder at each desk, so the participants could 
consult them at any point of the experiment. 
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4.5 Games, questionnaire and organization of the payments 
After having read the general instructions out loud, the experiment leader and the assistant 
handed out specific instructions for the first game. The participants were given 
approximately five minutes to read the instructions before the game started (see appendices 
2-4). After all the participants had completed the first game, the instructions were collected 
and instructions for the second games were distributed. This process was repeated until all of 
the four games were completed. The first game was the moral game for all of the 
participants. This is the game that is excluded from our analysis. The order of the subsequent 
three games was randomized. 
 
The participants could raise their hands at any point of the experiment in case they had 
questions, and the research leader or the assistant would approach their desk and assist. Very 
few of the participants had questions. This indicates that the instructions were clear and in 
general well understood. 
 
After the four games were completed, the participants were asked to fill out the 
questionnaire. In the meantime, the payments were prepared by the assistants in a separate 
room. The experiment was a double-blind, so neither the experimenters nor the other 
participants could associate any decisions to other participants. The assistants prepared 
payments by desk number and were not allowed into the experiment rooms. When the 
payments had been distributed and the questionnaires were completed, the participants could 
proceed to the exit. They were asked not to talk to anyone about the details of the 
experiment, and they were thanked for their participation.   
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5. Findings and analysis 
This chapter will use the data from the experiment to systematically investigate the 
relationship between the different variables. After a brief data validation, we familiarize the 
reader with the dataset by examining descriptive statistics. We will then move on to the main 
analysis and investigate the linkages between the variables by using the OLS method. 
 
5.1 Data validation 
The first step of the analysis is to investigate whether our data are meaningful and correct. 
We have systematically looked for outliers through scatter plots, and for every outlier 
detected we have carefully discussed what the reason for the extreme value might be and 
whether this observation should be removed from our data set. Furthermore, we have 
ensured that all of the data is in the correct format. 
 
Among the independent variables, SELFISH, RISK and EFFICIENCY, we have detected 
three outliers, one in each variable. Each outlier represented a clear deviation from the rest of 
the sample, as can be seen in the scatter plots in appendix 9. Participant 427 has a SELFISH 
score of 0.1729. This score indicates that the participant has on average distributed more 
tokens to the account belonging to the other participant than to himself. A closer 
investigation reveals that the participant has consistently distributed the majority of tokens to 
the x-account, regardless of the budget line, and this behavior can thus not be linked to 
efficiency concerns. We believe that this participant has misunderstood which account 
accrues to him. Participant 313 obtained a RISK score of 0.2159. This indicates that the 
participant has chosen to distribute the majority of the tokens to the most expensive account 
and thus “thrown money out the window”.  As this behavior is rather destructive, we believe 
that it was not intended. A similar interpretation goes for participant 130, who is represented 
by an EFFICIENCY score of 0.2324. We assume that these observations do not represent 
actual variation, but rather human misconception of the choice situation. We have removed 
these three scores and replaced them with “missing value”. Removing these outliers has an 
impact on the significance of the results. Some of the coefficients that would otherwise not 
be significant are now significant. 
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As for the dependent variable TATR, we have investigated each of the four items that 
constitute the variable. Regarding the second item, “In the present situation in Norway, we 
should do more to equalize incomes“, one participant indicated “3.5” and explained “for 
teachers and health care workers, yes”. We have rounded this score to 3 because the 
professional groups mentioned were rather specific, and this cannot be assumed to represent 
a general attitude in favor of redistribution. The rounding-down of the score does not change 
the results significantly.   
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics firstly present a sample and subsample mean table with significance 
testing of differences across subsamples. The table gives insight into whether respondents of 
different characteristics differ in responses. Furthermore, we display histograms depicting 
the distribution of the dependent and independent variables, to give an impression of the 
heterogeneity in the responses and whether there are any obvious patterns. Lastly, we inspect 
whether there are any correlations between the independent and background variables. In 
addition, a summarizing table of the number of observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation and min and max values for each independent variable can be found as appendix 9. 
 
5.2.1 Means and difference testing 
Table 1 below shows the mean of each independent variable for the total sample and for 
different subsamples. The differences between subsamples, men and women, above and 
below median age, left-wing and right-wing, high and low parental income and above and 
below median expenditures, are tested with a Mann-Whitney test. The resulting p-values are 
displayed with corresponding stars. The Mann-Whitney test, also known as the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test (Keller, 2009), tests the null hypothesis that two samples are from populations 
with the same distribution against the alternative hypothesis that they are not. A low p-value 
(under 10 percent) leads to rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis. 
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In the total sample, the means for SELFISH, RISK and EFFICIENCY are all close to the 
center value (0.75) of the probable interval (0.5 - 1). The progressivity variable, TATR, is 
also close to the center value of the possible interval (0 - 1). The RISK mean for women is 
significantly lower than for men at a 1 percent level, 0.7316 and 0.7943, respectively. This 
shows that women have on average displayed a higher level of risk aversion than men. 
Separating the sample by age does not yield any significant results. 
A comparison of left-wing/center and right-wing subjects’ SELFISH score shows a 
difference significant at a 5 percent level, indicating that right-wing subjects are more 
selfish. The means are 0.7483 and 0.8227, respectively. There is also a significant difference 
at 1 percent level in the TATR variable between the two groups, with values of 0.5916 and 
0.4464, respectively. This shows, as might be expected, that left-wing subjects are more in 
favor of progressive income taxation than right-wing subjects.  
 
Table 1. Means and difference testing of subsamples 
Note: The table displays the means of the variables for different subsamples 
and Mann-Whitney tests for differences between subsamples. The 
center/median value is included in the left-wing/center, low parental income and 
below median subsamples. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
SELFISH RISK EFFICIENCY TATR
All 0.7749 0.7648 0.7256 0.5389
Women 0.7710 0.7316 0.7127 0.5575
Men 0.7784 0.7943 0.7368 0.5226
   Prob > |z| 0.5942 0.0035*** 0.3068 0.2495
Below median age, age<=22 0.7823 0.7691 0.7212  0.5482
Above median age, age>22 0.7668 0.7603 0.7304 0.5288
   Prob > |z| 0.4239 0.6228 0.5777 0.6577
Left-wing/center 0.7483 0.7639 0.7183 0.5916
Right-wing 0.8227 0.7665 0.7386 0.4464
   Prob > |z| 0.0191** 0.9613 0.5250 0.0000***
Low parental income 0.7656 0.7482 0.7209 0.5778
High parental income 0.7939 0.7978 0.7353 0 .4611
   Prob > |z| 0.3567 0.0460** 0.5891 0.0008***
Below median expenditures 0.7416 0.7379 0.7018 0.5403
Above median expenditures 0.8213 0.8024 0.7587 0.5368
   Prob > |z| 0.0152**  0.0048*** 0.0244** 0.9749
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Dividing the sample into high and low (including the middle value) parental income groups 
shows no significant differences in means in either SELFISH or in EFFICIENCY.  There is, 
however, a highly significant difference in RISK and in TATR. The low parental income 
group is more risk averse than the high income group, significant at 5 percent. They also 
support progressivity more strongly than the high group, significant at 1 percent. Separating 
the sample by expenditures, above and below (including) the median, returns significant 
differences in all three independent variables, SELFISH and EFFICIENCY at a 5 percent 
level and RISK at a 1 percent level. This indicates that subjects with above median 
expenditures are less risk averse, more selfish and more concerned with efficiency, as 
opposed to equality, than subjects with expenditures below the median. 
 
5.2.2 Histograms 
The histograms are arranged so that the x-axis indicates values or intervals of the variable, 
while the y-axis indicates the percentage of the total sample with that value or a value within 
that interval. The graphical representation is useful for looking at the spread of the subjects’ 
values.   
 
Figure 6. Histograms 
Note: The panels show the distribution of the SELFISH, RISK, EFFICIENCY and TATR scores.  
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The SELFISH histogram shows a more or less equal spread across the scale. The exception 
is around value 1, where approximately 30 percent of the subjects are located. A non-
negligible share thus consistently chooses selfishly, i.e. allocates close to 100 percent to 
themselves. This is in line with results from previous studies (Engel, 2011). Around 8 
percent chose on average lower than 0.5, which represents choices that favor others over 
oneself. By examining these observations closer, we see that most of them are only 
marginally smaller than 0.5. We therefore assume that the deviation from 0.5 is not intended 
and interpret these choices as non-selfish.  
 
The RISK histogram shows a wide variety of risk attitudes, from allocating efficiently (risk 
neutral) to equalizing as much as possible (risk averse). Values of around 1 describe the 
choices of 11 percent of the sample, while 8 percent chose approximate 0.5-distributions on 
average. There seems to be a peak at 0.7 - 0.75.  
 
The histogram showing EFFICIENCY responses also displays variation across the whole 
interval. Again, there seems to be a peak at 0.7 - 0.75, which indicates equal weight given to 
efficiency and equality, and also around 0.5, which is a completely equal distribution. 
Approximately 12 percent distributed efficiently.  
 
The TATR histogram shows a bell-shaped distribution, with a peak at around 0.5 and 
diminishing values closer to 0 and 1. Around 2 percent of the subjects have a TATR value of 
1, signifying very strong support of progressive taxation. None have 0, signifying very 
strong opposition. 
    
5.2.3 Correlations 
The correlation matrix below displays the correlation coefficients for sets of independent and 
background variables. Correlation between variables is when their values appear to be 
related linearly. Perfect positive correlation, with a coefficient of 1, is when one variable 
consistently increases (decreases) when the other increases (decreases). A coefficient of -1, 
perfect negative correlation, indicates an opposite pattern. 0 indicates that there is no 
consistency. We interpret correlation coefficients between 0 and |0.3| as weak, |0.3| to |0.7| as 
moderate and |0.7| to |1| as strong. The matrix also includes significance stars and the p-
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values for each correlation. The 1-3 stars indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SELFISH variable is positively correlated with EXPENDITURES and 
POLITICALVIEW at 5 percent, but the relationship is weak, 0.2132 and 0.1790, 
respectively. RISK and EFFICIENCY have a moderate positive linear relationship 
significant at 1 percent, with a coefficient of 0.6667. RISK is also significantly correlated 
with GENDER at 1 percent level. The correlation is weak and negative at -0.2370. AGE is 
weakly correlated with EXPENDITURES. The coefficient of 0.2427 is positive and 
significant at 1 percent. AGE is also correlated negatively with PARENTALINCOME, with 
a coefficient of 0.2198. This correlation is weak and significant at 5 percent. 
EXPENDITURES and POLITICALVIEW are negatively correlated at 10 percent. The 
coefficient of -0.1566 shows that the negative relationship is weak. Lastly, 
PARENTALINCOME and POLITICALVIEW are weakly positively correlated with a 
coefficient of 0.2780, significant at a 1 percent level. 
 
SELFISH 1.0000 
RISK 0.0938 1.0000 
0.2829
EFFICIENCY -0.0022 0.6667*** 1.0000 
0.9802 0.0000
GENDER -0.0206 -0.2370*** -0.0857 1.0000
0.8132 0.0058 0.3247
AGE 0.0493 -0.0410 0.0850 -0.0332 1.0000 
0.5715 0.6382 0.3290 0.7024 
EXPENDITURES 0.2132** 0.0498 0.1156 0.1376 0.2427*** 1.0000
0.0149 0.5736 0.1903 0.1172 0.0052
PARENTAL INCOME 0.1078 0.1397 0.0650 -0.0039 -0.2198** 0.0412 1.0000 
0.2152 0.1075 0.4555 0.9639 0.0104 0.6404
POLITICAL VIEW 0.1790** -0.0095 0.0203 -0.1001 -0.0834 -0.1566* 0.2780*** 1.0000 
0.0400 0.9138 0.8170 0.2517 0.3398 0.0740 0.0012
AGEGENDEREFFICIENCYRISKSELFISH
POLITICAL 
VIEW
PARENTAL 
INCOME
EXPENDITURES
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
Note: The table shows pairwise correlations between independent and background variables, 
with p-values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5.3 Analysis 
We investigate the relationship between our variables by using the Ordinary Least Squares 
method (OLS), as we assume linear relationships between our dependent and independent 
variables. This method minimizes the squared vertical distances between an estimated line, 
predicted by linear approximation, and the observed responses (Keller, 2009). The 
assumptions of this method have been tested, and the results can be found as appendix 10. 
 
5.3.1 Regression 
We first perform a multiple linear regression analysis with TATR as our dependent variable 
and SELFISH, RISK and EFFICIENCY as independent variables. The regression returns 
beta values for a linear regression equation of the following form: 
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Table 3. Regressions 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in column (1) in table 3 above, this analysis does not generate any significant 
results. This might be because we have omitted variables that account for most of the 
variation. We need to control for background variables that might potentially account for a 
large part of the variation in the data. We include the background variables GENDER, AGE, 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
self -0.0646 0.0796 -1.074** -0.152 -0.828 -0.365
(0.0909) (0.0804) (0.515) (0.546) (0.554) (0.495)
selfdummy -0.0642
(0.186)
risk -0.213 -0.302** -1.319** -0.206 -2.688*** -1.766*** -0.771***
(0.151) (0.132) (0.608) (0.164) (0.614) (0.622) (0.200)
eff -0.0242 0.132 0.0413 -0.124 1.715*** 1.189** 0.552***
(0.166) (0.125) (0.165) (0.662) (0.622) (0.562) (0.187)
riskxself 1.365* 2.925*** 1.757**
(0.715) (0.724) (0.761)
riskxselfdummy 0.651**
(0.265)
effxself 0.122 -1.968*** -1.218*
(0.754) (0.723) (0.682)
effxselfdummy -0.521**
(0.237)
gender 0.00350 0.0122 0.00899
(0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0284)
age -0.0143*** -0.0131** -0.0128**
(0.00480) (0.00508) (0.00520)
expenditures -0.000182 -0.000156 -0.000269
(0.000197) (0.000199) (0.000204)
parentalincome -0.000104*** -0.000106*** -8.53e-05***
(2.50e-05) (2.50e-05) (2.97e-05)
politicalview -0.0619*** -0.0567*** -0.0576***
(0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Constant 0.767*** 1.302*** 1.535*** 0.833* 1.356*** 1.584*** 1.328***
(0.133) (0.153) (0.399) (0.432) (0.431) (0.367) (0.155)
Observations 132 128 132 132 132 128 129
R-squared 0.032 0.353 0.064 0.033 0.096 0.376 0.345
Note: Columns (1) through (7) depict regressions with different combinations of variables. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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PARENTALINCOME, EXPENDITURES and POLITICALVIEW in our linear regression 
analysis and regress for the equation below: 
 
                                                    
                                                
   
 
Column (2) shows that RISK is now significant at a 5 percent level. The coefficient is 
negative, indicating that there is a negative linear relationship. All other variables held 
constant, an increase in the RISK variable leads to a decrease in TATR. That is, the less risk 
averse a person is, the less inclined he is to support redistribution. This is in accordance with 
our hypothesis H2 and the reviewed literature. In addition, we see that both AGE, 
PARENTALINCOME and POLITICALVIEW are significant, all at a 1 percent level. This 
implies that the older you are, the less positive towards redistribution. Similarly we find that 
the higher parental income, the less inclined to support redistribution from the wealthy to the 
less well off. The negative coefficient of POLITICALVIEW indicates that a move to the 
right on the political scale is consistent with a weaker support for redistribution through 
progressive income taxation.  
 
5.3.2 Interaction effects 
Further, we investigate whether there are any interaction effects. Such effects arise when the 
simultaneous influence of two variables on a third variable is not additive. This way, the 
relationship between the dependent variable and an independent variable relies on the value 
of another independent variable. For example, it might be interesting to investigate whether 
the degree of SELFISH is important when interpreting the relationship between TATR and 
RISK. Is it so that selfish people assign more weight to the RISK variable, as this is assumed 
to be a self-interested concern? In a similar matter, do selfish people care less about the 
equality/efficiency trade-off, as this is regarded a moral concern? We create our two 
interaction variables by simply multiplying the two variables that we suspect to interact. 
RISKxSELFISH and EFFICIENCYxSELFISH are then included in our linear regression 
equation, first separately, then combined. Lastly, we add the background variables to obtain 
the following form:  
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As can be seen in column (6) in table 3, most of the independent variables are now 
statistically significant. RISK is still significant and the beta value is negative. However, as 
we now have added an interaction variable that includes RISK, the RISK variable alone is no 
longer meaningful. The reason for this is that the RISK variable should now include all 
participants with a SELFISH value of zero. This is never the case, as our variable 
theoretically should be between 0.5 and 1 and the lowest observed value is 0.46. The same 
interpretation goes for SELFISH and EFFICIENCY: The variables alone cannot be 
interpreted and are therefore not of interest.  
 
We therefore move on to interpreting the interaction variables. Firstly, we analyze the 
interaction variable RISKxSELFISH. We see that this variable is significant and the beta 
value is positive. The sum of RISK and RISKxSELFISH is close to zero when SELFISH is 
equal to 1 and a lincom test verifies that this sum is not significantly different from zero. 
This result indicates that those who are selfish do not care about their risk preferences when 
evaluating income tax preferences. Our finding presumably contradicts our assumption that 
selfishness would lead to an increased concern for personal risk preferences. We then 
investigate the interaction effect of EFFICIENCY and SELFISH. The combined effect of 
EFFICIENCY and EFFICIENCYxSELFISH is close to zero. A lincom test confirms that the 
sum cannot be considered different from zero. This indicates that for people who are selfish, 
the equality/efficiency concern is irrelevant. This seems plausible, as the equality/efficiency 
trade-off is a moral, non-selfish concern.  
 
5.3.3 Stepwise interaction effects 
We consider, however, the possibility that the effect of SELFISH on RISK’s impact on 
TATR may not be linear across all levels of SELFISH. The RISKxSELFISH variable above 
includes all subjects, as none of our subjects have a SELFISH value of zero. The 
RISKxSELFISH variable is thus calculated so as to describe the effect of every level of 
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SELFISH in our sample. If, however, the subjects with high and low SELFISH values are 
affected disproportionately, their RISKxSELFISH variables will differ. The regressions in 
columns (3)-(6) will not catch this stepwise, nonlinear interaction and will attempt to 
generalize the relationship. The resulting betas can then be misleading in either size or 
significance. The same argumentation applies to our second interaction variable, 
EFFICIENCYxSELFISH. Luckily, we can deal with both issues simultaneously. 
 
In order to incorporate the possibility of a stepwise shift in how SELFISH affects RISK’s 
and EFFICIENCY’s impact on TATR in different ways, we create a SELFISH dummy. 
 
                                          
                                              
                                               
                    
 
This allows us to divide the sample in two groups, those with high values of SELFISH and 
those with low values of SELFISH. We use the median SELFISH value as dividing point, 
and assign a value of 1 to the group with values of SELFISH above the median and a value 
of 0 to the other. The median is chosen because it is a natural dividing point as it splits the 
sample in two groups of equal size. 
 
As the non-SELFISH group is now defined as a low SELFISH group, it actually has subjects 
in it. We are therefore able to interpret the RISK variable by itself in addition to the 
interaction variable. Column (7) in table 3 shows that the low SELFISH group has a negative 
and significant RISK beta. This means that for this group, risk neutrality decreases the 
TATR value and risk aversion increases it. The positive (and significant) 
RISKxSELFISHDUMMY beta seems to counter the negative RISK beta. This indicates that 
selfishness decreases the negative effect of risk preferences when considering TATR. It does 
not, however, seem large enough to invert the total effect of RISK so that it becomes 
positive. To investigate the total effect of RISK on TATR for the high SELFISH group, we 
test RISK and RISKxSELFISHDUMMY with lincom. The lincom test verifies that the sum 
of the two variables is not statistically different from zero. The high SELFISH group seems 
thus not to be concerned with RISK.    
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The low SELFISH group has a positive and significant EFFICIENCY beta. The people who 
are not very selfish thus care about the equality/efficiency trade-off, and a concern for 
efficiency leads to a preference for redistribution. This is contrary to our hypothesis H3. The 
EFFICIENCYxSELFISHDUMMY has a negative and significant beta value and hence 
works in the opposite direction. This indicates that high levels of SELFISH might nullify or 
even invert the total effect of EFFICIENCY on TATR. We test the total effect with lincom, 
and the results show that the total effect for the high SELFISH group, EFFICIENCY plus 
EFFICIENCYxSELFISHDUMMY, is not significantly different from zero. This indicates 
that the individuals in the high SELFISH group are not concerned with the 
equality/efficiency trade-off.  
 
Note that the SELFISHDUMMY beta is not significant. It does therefore not add to the 
explanation of TATR. Selfishness alone does not seem important when explaining the 
motivations behind income tax preferences. It only has an effect in combination with other 
variables. 
  
5.3.4 Margin analysis 
Having found an indication that the effect of RISK and EFFICIENCY on TATR changes 
with different levels of SELFISH, we want to explore this relationship further. When we 
created the SELFISH dummy above, we divided the sample into high and low SELFISH. 
These two groups can potentially be internally heterogeneous, as the participants within the 
same group can have very different levels of SELFISH. Using dummies involves simplifying 
and excluding data, and can thus hide interesting variations in the dataset. In addition, when 
creating the dummy we chose the median as the dividing point. This might not be the most 
suitable method, as there might be other ways to create the high/low groups that capture the 
effects more exactly. We therefore explore further the interaction between risk, efficiency 
and selfishness with a more nuanced approach. 
 
We want to measure the effect of RISK on TATR for different levels of SELFISH. We 
compute margin plots and tables that depict the marginal effect of RISK on TATR for 
SELFISH=0.5, 0.6,...,1, see table 4 and figure 7. This marginal effect thus includes both the 
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effect of RISK alone and the interaction RISKxSELFISH at each specific level of SELFISH. 
The same method is employed with EFFICIENCY, as depicted in table 5 and figure 8.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average marginal effects of RISK on TATR 
Note: The graph illustrates the marginal effect of RISK on TATR at 
different levels of SELFISH. The dotted lines mark the upper and lower 
bounds of the 95% confidence interval. 
Table 4. Average marginal effects of RISK on TATR 
Note: The dy/dx column shows the marginal effects of RISK on TATR at 
different levels of SELFISH.  
SELF level dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z
0.5 -0.8869 0.2599 -3.41 0.001 -1.3962 -0.3775
0.6 -0.7111 0.1961 -3.63 0.000 -1.0955 -0.3267
0.7 -0.5354 0.1449 -3.69 0.000 -0.8194 -0.2514
0.8 -0.3596 0.1229 -2.93 0.003 -0.6006 -0.1187
0.9 -0.1839 0.1443 -1.27 0.203 -0.4668 0.0989
1 -0.0081 0.1953 -0.04 0.967 -0.3909 0.3746
[95% Conf. Interval]
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The tables show that for low and medium levels of SELFISH, RISK effects TATR in a 
negative direction. The size of this negative effect decreases as the SELFISH value 
increases. At SELFISH levels of 0.859 and above, RISK is no longer statistically significant 
at a 5 percent level. As for EFFICIENCY, SELFISH values below 0.783 make 
EFFICIENCY relate to TATR in a positive direction. This positive relationship decreases as 
Figure 8. Average marginal effects of EFFICIENCY on TATR 
Note: The graph illustrates the marginal effect of RISK on TATR at different 
levels of SELFISH. The dotted lines mark the upper and lower bounds of 
the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Table 5. Average marginal effects of EFFICIENCY on TATR 
Note: The dy/dx column shows the marginal effects of EFFICIENCY on 
TATR at different levels of SELFISH.  
SELF level dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z
0.5 0.5796 0.2399 2.42 0.016 0.1095 1.0497
0.6 0.4578 0.1838 2.49 0.013 0.0976 0.8179
0.7 0.3359 0.1390 2.42 0.016 0.0636 0.6083
0.8 0.2141 0.1190 1.80 0.072 -0.0191 0.4473
0.9 0.0923 0.1354 0.68 0.495 -0.1730 0.3576
1 -0.0296 0.1783 -0.17 0.868 -0.3790 0.3199
[95% Conf. Interval]
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SELFISH increases. For SELFISH values at 0.783 and above, EFFICIENCY is no longer 
significant at a 5 percent level. 
 
The non-significance of RISK and EFFICIENCY for very selfish subjects could simply be 
due to a too small sample, but robustness testing showed that this is not the case. 
Investigations also show that the RISK and EFFICIENCY values of very selfish subjects do 
not differ significantly from the rest of the sample. This was also indicated by the lack of 
correlation between RISK and SELFISH, and EFFICIENCY and SELFISH, as can be seen 
in table 2. 
 
5.4 Robustness 
In order to verify that our model is robust, we have investigated the effect on the results 
when making slight adjustments to the analysis. We have created the SELFISH dummy 
using several different dividing points, such as the mean value and the center value of 0.75. 
This appears to have no impact on our results. The same goes for the choice of making 
SELFISH a dummy. This choice does not greatly impact the results of the analysis. We have 
also investigated the inclusion of other dummy variables, but the results generated from 
these attempts were not, in our eyes, as meaningful as with SELFISH as the only dummy. 
We have searched for other interaction effects besides RISKxSELFISH and 
EFFICIENCYxSELFISH. The inclusion of alternative interaction variables was not of any 
value.  
 
We also performed regressions for subsamples of high and low parental income, and high 
and low expenditures to check for differences in the SELFISH coefficient. The SELFISH 
coefficients of all four subsamples were of the same directional effect and not significantly 
different from zero. Those with richer parents do not have a significant SELFISH 
coefficient. The same applies to those with poorer parents. We therefore have no reason to 
believe that they react to selfishness in opposite directions. If selfishness in the “rich 
parents” subsample related negatively to redistribution preferences, while in the “poor 
parents” subsample it related positively, this could potentially have explained why SELFISH 
is not significant by itself. We have no indication of this being the case. Equivalent testing 
for the high and low expenditures subsamples yielded the same results.  
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Furthermore, we have investigated whether the four different questions the TATR variable is 
based on affect the relationships in our analyses differently. By performing separate 
regressions, we were able to compare the direction and strength of the variables for each 
question. Although some questions yielded very significant relationships while others did 
not, the overall pattern of the regression outputs remained unchanged.  
 
Finally, we have performed our analyses with and without the outliers removed. The results 
did not differ substantially, except for being more significant when outliers are removed. It 
appears that our model is fairly robust.      
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6. Discussion 
The following discussion will review the findings from the previous chapter. We suggest an 
interpretation and look at its implications for the different approaches to understanding 
income tax systems. Furthermore, we offer a critical evaluation of the methodology 
employed. Lastly, we propose some areas of interest for further research. 
 
Selfishness in itself appears to be of no significance when evaluating income tax systems. A 
high degree of selfishness does not necessarily lead to a preference for a flat income tax 
system and a low level of redistribution. This is an interesting finding, because it is contrary 
to our hypothesis H1. A possible explanation for this is that our premise, stating that all 
participants expect an income above the national average, is not correct. If some participants 
expect above average income, and some below, the SELFISH variable can relate to 
redistribution either positively or negatively.  
 
Another possible explanation is that our premise is irrelevant. It might be the case that when 
the participants evaluate whether or not they will lose on progressive taxation, they do not 
take into account their expected lifespan income. Instead of assuming that they will have a 
lifespan income above the average and therefore lose money on progressive taxation, they 
rather consider their current relative standing and economic background. If this is the case, 
the levels of the background variables EXPENDITURES and PARENTALINCOME are 
relevant for the SELFISH variable. People with high values of EXPENDITURES and 
PARENTALINCOME should have a negative SELFISH coefficient, while people with low 
values of EXPENDITURES and PARENTALINCOME should have a positive SELFISH 
coefficient. However, as we determined in the robustness analysis, we have no indication of 
such a relationship.   
 
In either case, selfishness has an impact on income tax preferences as it moderates the 
relationships of the other concerns. The importance of the SELFISH variable should thus not 
be dismissed. Examination of the other self-interested variable, RISK, and the moral concern 
will shed light upon this moderating effect. 
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In general, it looks like RISK affects TATR in a negative direction: The more willing to take 
risk, the less supportive of progressive taxation and vice versa. This is in line with our 
hypothesis H2, stating that the more risk averse a person is, the more positive he is to social 
insurance through redistribution. As a certain degree of risk aversion is found among the 
majority of individuals in our sample, optimal tax theory implies that the social insurance 
aspect should be included in the social welfare function. Considering the majority being risk 
averse, it is also likely that the median voter is somewhat risk averse. The preferred income 
tax system of the median voter will therefore probably entail a certain degree of 
progressivity. 
 
However, we find that when the level of selfishness reaches a certain point, risk no longer 
seems to matter. Selfish people do not appear to be preoccupied with risk concerns. This is 
surprising. We consider both SELFISH and RISK as self-interested, self-regarding aspects 
and it seems natural that the two would correlate. One possible interpretation of this finding 
is that those who are selfish over a certain level tend to act overconfidently. This might be 
because they do not take their risk preferences into consideration when making distributional 
choices. The social insurance aspect of redistribution is less relevant to them, as they do not 
worry about the risk of low income in the future. This is not necessarily because they are less 
risk averse, but because they assign less weight to their risk preferences.  
 
EFFICIENCY is not significant when SELFISH values are high. This is in line with our 
assumptions: As the equality/efficiency trade-off is a moral concern, selfish people should 
not attach any importance to this aspect. On the other hand, at low levels of SELFISH, 
EFFICIENCY is significant with a positive beta value. The interpretation is that for people 
who are not particularly selfish (and thus care about moral concerns), a preference for 
efficiency is connected with a positive attitude towards redistribution. This is not what we 
would expect. Our hypothesis H3 states that people who are concerned with efficiency 
should favor a flat income tax system, while people who value equality should be more in 
favor of a progressive system. The hypothesis is derived from research on the 
equality/efficiency trade-off. Our finding is just the opposite: As efficiency concerns 
increase, support of progressivity increases. From a social welfare point of view, this means 
that the optimal income tax system will be more progressive if those who care about moral 
concerns value efficiency. With a median voter approach, the resulting income tax system 
will be more progressive if the median voter is concerned with efficiency than otherwise. 
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The EFFICIENCY results indicate that many people associate progressive taxation with 
efficiency. It is not unlikely that this might be the case in Norway, as the Nordic model has a 
strong position. The Nordic model incorporates a high degree of redistribution, and it is 
based on a belief that equality enhances efficiency. The Norwegian economist Karl Ove 
Moene advocates this view. He argues that a more equal distribution of wages and a strong 
welfare state leads to efficient outcomes (Barth and Moene, 2008; Moene et. al., 2009). A 
more equal distribution of wealth is seen as fair, and when people perceive the system as 
fair, work ethics increase and cooperation is higher. It is possible that our results would have 
been different if the experiment was carried out in a country with another economic model 
and a different culture. 
 
From the analysis of the independent variables we have thus found that, for low and 
moderate levels of selfishness, both risk preferences and the equality/efficiency trade-off 
must be included in the utility functions of the social welfare function and of the median 
voter. For very selfish people, the results indicate that neither selfishness, risk preferences 
nor the equality/efficiency trade-off relate to redistribution preferences. Other concerns must 
therefore be included in the regression to make it suitable to describe the TATR of selfish 
people. Implications for the optimal tax theory are that risk preferences and efficiency 
concerns should only be included in the utility function of people who are not very selfish. 
As for the median voter, his degree of selfishness will be crucial for the resulting income tax 
system. 
 
The findings related to the background variables are also of interest. The analysis shows that 
AGE is significant and negatively related to TATR. Growing older thus seems to lessen the 
support of progressive taxation. One explanation might be that the economic situation of the 
older participants differs from the younger. If the older participants have more money at 
disposal, they can lose more on a redistributive tax than the young. The positive correlation 
between expenditures and age supports this explanation, as high expenditures assume more 
money at disposal. It might also be that the older participants share some preferences that our 
research does not capture directly. The older students might have spent more time and effort 
on their studies, and consequently feel more entitled to their earnings and thereby less 
positive towards redistribution.  
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Similarly, we see that people with high parental income are less positive to redistribution. 
This attitude seems motivated by concerns for themselves. Our SELFISH variable is not 
significant, even when we do not control for background variables. Nevertheless, these 
findings indicate that a concern for pecuniary payoff might still be of relevance. It is also 
possible that the “high income” group share certain traits that make them less positive 
towards progressive taxation. For example, PARENTALINCOME is positively correlated 
with POLITICALVIEW, indicating that the higher the income of the parents, the further to 
the right in the political landscape. POLITICALVIEW is significant and suggests that the 
further to the right, the less positive towards progressive taxation. This is in line with the 
classical left-right conception. In both optimal tax theory and political economy tax models, 
age, economic background and political view should thus be taken into consideration, as 
these factors are relevant for income tax preferences.  
  
All in all, our model explains approximately 38 percent of the variation in our data. 
Selfishness, risk and efficiency matter, and these variables certainly deserve a place in the 
model. However, other factors might be just as, or even more, important. One aspect that 
could potentially influence income tax preferences is status quo bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Sheffrin, 1994). Such a bias would make people inclined to favor an 
income tax system that is similar to the one already in place. Although all participants face 
the same actual tax system, their perceptions of its degree of progressivity might differ 
(Sheffrin, 1993). Those who believe that the current tax system is very progressive will also 
tend to be in favor of a progressive system. The importance of effort versus luck is another 
concern that maybe ought to be included in the analysis (Fong, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 
2005; Cappelen et. al., 2010). People tend to find differences in income due to differences in 
effort as fair, while differences due to luck are unfair and should be corrected for. Hence, 
support for redistribution will increase when people believe that income differences mainly 
are a consequence of luck. A final suggestion of possible alternative variables is the aspect of 
optimism and pessimism towards the future and the degree of social mobility (Piketty, 1995; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001). People who are very pessimistic regarding possibilities of 
future income will probably be more supportive of progressive taxation and vice versa.  
      
Besides having left out potentially important variables, there are possible weaknesses 
concerning the method employed. This might have modified some of the results. One 
possible weakness is related to the questions measuring tax attitudes towards redistribution 
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(TATR). The questions can have been difficult to understand, or people might not have a 
strong attitude towards and a reflective opinion about these issues. The questions might be 
insufficient or simply not suited to measure income tax preferences accurately. Previous 
research has also shown that people tend to indicate different answers when questions are 
framed in an abstract versus a concrete manner (Roberts, Hite and Bradley, 1994) and that 
people might not answer in line with their true preferences when faced with a questionnaire 
(Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002). Nevertheless, we aimed at using questions as simple 
and unambiguous as possible, and we believe that the majority of the participants understood 
the meaning of them. In addition, we have tried to diversify by including questions that 
measure different aspects of redistribution preferences.  
 
Other questions that might have been hard to answer were the questions where the 
participants were asked to estimate their expenditures the previous year and the annual gross 
income of their parents. Although some might have struggled with this task, it looks as if 
most participants indicated reasonable levels. 
 
Further critique relates to the use of an experiment as a method for measuring the 
relationship between tax preferences towards redistribution, selfishness, risk and 
equality/efficiency. A laboratory experiment is a rather artificial setting, and the choices 
people make here can thus differ from the choices they would make in real world situations. 
For instance, the risk of not gaining 100 NOK in an experiment setting might trigger other 
behavior than the real world scenario of risking losing the social security net. Consequently, 
we cannot blindly extend the results from the experiment to the real world. In addition, the 
generalizability of the results can be questioned as a result of the sample. The subjects were 
all students at the University of Bergen and hence unlikely to represent the characteristics of 
the population as a whole. We do however see a wide spread in responses in all independent 
variables and most background variables, which indicates that the sample is not 
homogeneous. Also, the setting of the lab experiment has the advantages of being an 
isolated, controlled environment. This allows for precise, robust, non-polluted measures. As 
the experimenters are in control of everything that happens, they can exclude all factors they 
do not wish to include and create clean concepts and settings. This increases internal 
validity. 
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Although this analysis has generated interesting results, further research is needed in order to 
establish what motivates income tax preferences. Other independent variables must be 
considered, and different methods should be employed to try to establish causality. In 
addition, it would be interesting to investigate further why efficiency concerns lead to a 
greater support for redistribution and why risk preferences are irrelevant to the very selfish. 
It would also be of interest to explore whether different ways of measuring progressivity 
preferences lead to similar results, both regarding the type of questions asked and the method 
of self-reporting preferences through a questionnaire.   
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7. Concluding remarks  
In the search for an ideal and realizable tax system, an understanding of human motivation is 
vital. Theory suggests that both selfish and non-selfish concerns can lie behind preferences 
for redistribution, in the form of progressive income taxation. By means of an experiment, 
we have tested hypotheses regarding the relationship between selfishness, risk preferences 
and the equality/efficiency trade-off, and preferences for redistribution.  
 
Our results indicate that income tax preferences result from both self-interest and moral 
concerns. Selfishness in itself does not seem to have any direct link to redistribution 
preferences. This is contrary to our hypothesis. It does however affect how the remaining 
variables relate to tax attitudes towards redistribution. For very selfish people, the results 
cannot confirm any relationship between either risk or efficiency concerns and attitudes 
towards progressive taxation. On the other hand, for people with low or moderate levels of 
selfishness, risk aversion is associated with a positive attitude towards redistribution. This is 
in accordance with our hypothesis, supporting the view of progressive taxation as social 
insurance. People with low or moderate levels of selfishness also display a tendency to 
support redistribution if they are concerned with efficiency. This is contrary to our 
hypothesis and may be explained by confidence in the Nordic model. Finally, the further to 
the right on the political scale, the more negative the attitudes towards redistribution. The 
same relationship is found regarding parental income and age: The wealthier the parents and 
the higher the age of the participants, the lower the support for progressive taxation. 
 
If these findings can be generalized, they can have important implications for public support 
of tax policies. Our findings are a contribution in the search for a welfare function that 
captures people’s true preferences. This is imperative in order to create an ideal tax system. 
Our findings also augment the understanding of the median voter, facilitating the design of a 
tax system that gains majority support. Although these results are interesting, we need 
supplemental research on additional variables and causal relationships in order to fully 
benefit from them. As we progress in obtaining a more detailed and profound understanding 
of tax preferences, hopefully our knowledge will help us advance towards a well-functioning 
and well-understood tax system.  
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Introduction 
This is an experiment in decision-making. Your payoffs will depend partly on your decisions, the 
decisions of other participants, and partly on chance. Funding for this experiment has been 
provided by public and private research foundations. Please pay careful attention to the 
instructions as a considerable amount of money is (potentially) at stake. 
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your payoffs will be kept strictly 
confidential. Each participant is assigned a participant ID number. This number will be used to 
record all data. Neither the experimenters nor the other participants will be able to link you to 
any of your decisions. Neither your name nor any other identifying information about you will be 
used in any final reports of the study. 
The entire experiment should be complete within 1-1/2 – 2 hours. Your earnings in the 
experiment will be 100 NOK as a participation fee (simply for showing up on time) plus 
whatever you earn in the experiment. You will be paid privately according to your participant ID 
number at the end of the experiment. Details of how you will make decisions and receive 
payments will be provided below.  
During the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of NOK. Your 
earnings will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated at the end of the experiment 
into NOK at the following rate: 
5 Tokens = 1.20 NOK 
The instructions will be read aloud by the experimenter. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and a research assistant will approach your desk.  
Once the experiment begins, we ask everyone to remain silent. In order to keep your decisions 
private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant.  
The computer program 
The experiment has four parts. In each part of the experiment, you will participate in 50 
independent decision problems that share a common form. This section describes in detail the 
process that will be repeated in all decision problems and the computer program that you will use 
to make your decisions. An example of the computer dialog window is shown in Attachment 1.  
In each decision problem, you will be asked to allocate tokens between two accounts, labeled x 
and y. The x account corresponds to the x-axis (the horizontal axis) and the y account 
corresponds to the y-axis (the vertical axis) on a two-dimensional graph. Each choice will 
involve choosing a point on a line representing possible token allocations. The instructions for 
each part will describe in detail how the payoff for each part of the experiment will be 
determined.  
Each decision problem will start by having the computer select such a line randomly from the set 
of lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more tokens but with no intercept 
exceeding 100 tokens. Examples of lines that you might face are shown in Attachment 2. In each 
part of the experiment, the lines selected for you in different decision problems are independent 
of each other and of the lines selected for any of the other participants in their decision problems, 
and will not depend on your choices in any of the earlier decision problems. 
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In each choice, you may choose any x and y pair that is on the line. For example, as illustrated in 
Attachment 3, choice A represents a decision to allocate q tokens to the x account and r tokens to 
the y account. Similarly, choice B represents a decision to allocate w tokens to the x account and 
z tokens to the y account. 
To choose an allocation, use the mouse to move the pointer on the computer screen to the 
allocation that you desire. The computer will only allow you to choose x and y combinations that 
are on the line. When you are ready to make your decision, left-click to enter your chosen 
allocation. After that, confirm your decision by clicking on the Submit button. To move on to the 
next round, click the OK button. Once you have clicked the OK button, your decision cannot be 
revised.  
Next, you will be asked to make a decision in another independent decision. This process will be 
repeated until all 50 decision problems in each part of the experiment are completed. At that 
point, you may have to wait for other participants to finish. Each part of the experiment will end 
after all participants have made all their decisions. At the end of each part of the experiment, you 
will receive further instructions. At the end the experiment, the computer will randomly select 
one of the 50 decision rounds from each of the four parts of the experiment to carry out for 
payoffs. The round selected from each part depends solely upon chance. 
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 Attachment 1 
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Attachment 2 
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x0 100 
100
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x0 100 
100
y 
x0 100 
100
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Attachment 3 
y 
x0 100 
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77
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART D 
For each allocation of tokens to the x account and the y account that you make in this part of the 
experiment, you will receive the number of tokens in your y account.  Another person, who will 
be chosen at random (entirely dependent upon chance) from the group of participants in the 
experiment, will receive the number of tokens in your x account.  
You will also receive the tokens allocated to the x account by a third person, where the third 
person is chosen at random from the group of participants in the experiment. The computer will 
make sure that the participant to whom you allocate tokens does not allocate tokens to you as a 
third person (and vice versa). Neither you nor any other participant will observe who allocated 
tokens to whom in any decision round, that is, the choices of all participants are anonymous in 
the experiment. 
Your earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined as follows. At the end of the 
experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the 50 decision rounds to carry out for 
payoffs. The round selected depends solely upon chance. You will then be paid the tokens you 
allocated to the y account in this round. In addition, you will also be paid the tokens that the 
randomly chosen third person allocated to her or his x account in this round. You will therefore 
be paid two groups of tokens: one based on your own decision to allocate tokens and one based 
on the decision of another random participant to allocate tokens.  
For example, suppose that in the round the computer chose to carry out for payoffs, you chose 
allocation A, as illustrated in Attachment 3. In that case you would be paid r tokens from your 
own y account and the recipient will be paid q tokens from the x account. The payment to you 
from the choice paid by the third person in the selected round is determined in the same way. 
At the end of the experiment, the tokens paid to you from the selected round will be converted 
into money. Recall that each token will be worth 1.20 NOK. At the end of this part of the 
experiment, you will receive further instructions. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART R 
For each allocation that you make in this part of the experiment in the x account and the y 
account, the computer will randomly (entirely dependent upon chance) select one of the 
accounts, x or y. It is equally likely that account x or account y will be chosen. You will only 
receive the number of tokens you allocated to the account that was chosen. The tokens you 
allocated to the other account will be lost (not allocated to anyone).  
Your earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined as follows. At the end of the 
experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the 50 decision rounds to carry out for 
payoffs. The round selected depends solely upon chance. You will only be paid the number of 
tokens you allocated to the account that was chosen in this round. These are the only tokens you 
will be paid from this part of the experiment. Recall that it is equally likely that account x or 
account y will be chosen. 
For example, suppose that in the round the computer chose to carry out for payoffs, you chose 
allocation A, as illustrated in Attachment 3, and that the computer chose account x for you in that 
round. In that case you would be paid q tokens in total. Similarly, if the computer chose the 
account y for you in that round then you would be paid r tokens in total.  
At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. Recall that each token 
will be worth 1.20 NOK. At the end of this part of the experiment, you will receive further 
instructions. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART O 
For each allocation that you make in this part of the experiment to the x account and the y 
account, two other participants chosen at random (entirely dependent upon chance) from the 
group of participants in the experiment will receive tokens. One participant will receive the 
tokens you allocated to the x account; another participant will receive the tokens you allocated to 
the y account.  
You will receive the tokens a third person allocated to the x account and a fourth person 
allocated to the y account. These persons will also be chosen at random from the group of 
participants in the experiment. The computer will make sure that the participant to whom you 
allocate tokens does not allocate tokens to you as a third or fourth person (and vice versa). 
Neither you nor any other participants will observe who allocated tokens to whom, that is, the 
choices of all participants are anonymous in the experiment. 
In this part of the experiment, your earnings are not determined by your own choices, but by the 
choices made by the randomly chosen third and fourth person. Your choices, however, will 
determine the earnings of two other randomly chosen participants. At the end of the experiment, 
the computer will randomly select one of the 50 decision rounds to carry out for payoffs. You 
will then be paid the tokens that the randomly chosen third person allocated to the x account and 
the randomly chosen fourth person allocated to the y accounts in this round. In the same way, 
two other randomly chosen participants will be paid what you allocated to the x account and y 
account in this round, respectively.  
For example, suppose that in the round the computer chose to carry out for payoffs, you chose 
allocation A, as illustrated in Attachment 3. In that case, two other participants will be paid r 
tokens and q tokens, respectively. The payment to you from the choices made by the third person 
and the fourth person in the selected round is determined in the same way.   
At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. Recall that each token 
will be worth 1.20 NOK. At the end of this part of the experiment, you will receive further 
instructions. 
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Small survey 
1. What is your age in years?
2. What is your gender? (M/F)
3. What is your best estimate of your total expenditures the previous calendar year (2012)?
4. What is the total (gross) income of your parents? Please make your best guess and tick off the
corresponding circle.
o 0 to less than 250 000 NOK
o 250 000 to less than 500 000 NOK
o 500 000 to less than 750 000 NOK
o 750 000 to less than 1 000 000 NOK
o 1 000 000 to less than 1 250 000 NOK
o 1 250 000 to less than 1 500 000 NOK
o 1 500 000 NOK or more
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling the 
corresponding number. 
5. A society should aim at equalizing incomes.
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree completely 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. In the present situation in Norway, we should do more to equalize incomes.
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree completely 
1 2 3 4 5 
Appendix 5. Questionnaire
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7. Imagine two people, one earning twice as much as the other:
The person earning twice as much should pay more than double of the other in tax.
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree completely 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The government should spend more of the tax revenues on social services and benefits targeting
the poor than the rich.
Disagree 
completely 
Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree completely 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. What total amount of tax per year, if any at all, should in your opinion be paid by a person earning
NOK 200,000 a year? By taxes, we mean all personal income taxes. Indicate your answers in
NOK.
And what total amount of tax should be paid by a person earning NOK 400,000? 
And what total amount of tax should be paid by a person earning NOK 800,000? 
And what total amount of tax should be paid by a person earning NOK 1,600,000? 
10. Below is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
very left-wing to very right-wing. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Very
left-wing Left-wing 
Slightly 
left-wing Moderate 
Slightly 
right-wing Right-wing
Very 
right-wing 
O O O O O O O 
Appendix 5. Questionnaire
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Appendix 6. TATR2 preliminary testing
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Appendix 7. Descriptive pool
Mean SD Median Min Max
Age 23,17 3,92 22 19 48
Parental Income 944,444 473,817 875
Expenditures 122,938 65,545 120 0 400
Political view 3,89 1,23 4 1 6
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9 Instructions
SA1 informs the leader about the number of partici-
pants present when all participants are seated.
9.1 General introduction
Leader reads on signal.
Welcome. My name is ... and I will lead this session. Since the results from
this experiment will be used in a research project, we ask you to follow the rules
of conduct that you have on your desk:
• Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment.
• If you have questions, raise your hand and we will assist you.
• Visiting websites during the experiment is not allowed.
• Using you mobile phone is not allowed during the experiment.
• Visiting websites during the experiment is not allowed.
• If you fail to comply with these rules, you might be asked to leave the
experiment without compensation.
This is an experiment in decision-making. Your payoffs will depend partly on
your decisions, the decisions of other participants, and partly on chance. Funding
for this experiment has been provided by public and private research foundations.
Please pay careful attention to the instructions as a considerable amount of money
is (potentially) at stake.
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your payoffs
will be kept strictly confidential. Each participant is assigned a participant ID
number. This number will be used to record all data. Neither the experimenters
nor the other participants will be able to link you to any of your decisions. Neither
your name nor any other identifying information about you will be used in any
final reports of the study.
The entire experiment should be complete within one and a half to two hours.
Your earnings in the experiment will be 100 NOK as a participation fee (simply
for showing up on time) plus whatever you earn in the experiment. You will
be paid privately according to your participant ID number at the end of the
Appendix 8. Script
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experiment. Details of how you will make decisions and receive payments will be
provided below.
During the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead
of NOK. Your earnings will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated
at the end of the experiment into NOK at the following rate:
1 Token = 1.20 NOK
The instructions will be read aloud by the experimenter. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand and a research assistant will approach your
desk.
Once the experiment begins, we ask everyone to remain silent. In order to
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other parti-
cipant. Also, make sure to not close the program window at any time during the
experiment.
9.2 The computer program
The experiment has four parts. In each part of the experiment, you will participate
in 50 independent decision problems that share a common form. This section
describes in detail the process that will be repeated in all decision problems and
the computer program that you will use to make your decisions. An example of
the computer dialog window is shown in Attachment 1.
Leader waits till everyone has found Attachment 1.
In each decision problem, you will be asked to allocate tokens between two
accounts, labeled x and y. The x account corresponds to the x-axis (the horizontal
axis) and the y account corresponds to the y-axis (the vertical axis) on a two-
dimensional graph. Each choice will involve choosing a point on a line representing
possible token allocations. The instructions for each part will describe in detail
how the payoff for each part of the experiment will be determined.
Each decision problem will start by having the computer select such a line
randomly from the set of lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50
or more tokens but with no intercept exceeding 100 tokens. Examples of lines
that you might face are shown in Attachment 2. In each part of the experiment,
the lines selected for you in different decision problems are independent of each
other and of the lines selected for any of the other participants in their decision
problems, and will not depend on your choices in any of the earlier decision
problems.
Appendix 8. Script
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In each choice, you may choose any x and y pair that is on the line. For
example, as illustrated in Attachment 3, choice A represents a decision to allocate
q tokens to the x account and r tokens to the y account. Similarly, choice B
represents a decision to allocate w tokens to the x account and z tokens to the y
account.
To choose an allocation, use the mouse to move the pointer on the computer
screen to the allocation that you desire. The computer will only allow you to
choose x and y combinations that are on the line. When you are ready to make
your decision, left-click to enter your chosen allocation. After that, confirm your
decision by clicking on the Submit button. To move on to the next round, click
the OK button. Once you have clicked the OK button, your decision cannot be
revised.
Next, you will be asked to make a decision in another independent decision.
This process will be repeated until all 50 decision problems in each part of the
experiment are completed. At that point, you may have to wait for other parti-
cipants to finish. Each part of the experiment will end after all participants have
made all their decisions. At the end of each part of the experiment, you will rece-
ive further instructions. At the end the experiment, the computer will randomly
select one of the 50 decision rounds from each of the four parts of the experiment
to carry out for payoffs. The round selected from each part depends solely upon
chance.
Leader continues when both rooms are ready.
9.3 Part 1
You will now be given the instructions for part 1. Please raise your hand if you
have any questions.
SA1 hands out Part 1 instructions
Anne-Mari gives a sign to Ranveig when the partici-
pants have finished reading the Part 1 instructions, and
when nobody has more questions. Ranveig will then start
Part 1.
Ranveig gives a sign when all of the participants are
finished with Part 1, and the leaders continue reading
You have now finished Part 1 of the experiment. We will now collect the
instructions for Part 1.
SA1 collects the papers for Part 1. Leader waits till
SA1 has finished collecting the Part 1 instructions
Appendix 8. Script
87
9.4 Part 2
You will now be given the instructions for part 2. Please raise your hand if you
have any questions.
SA1 hands out Part 2 instructions
Anne-Mari gives a sign to Ranveig when the partici-
pants have finished reading the Part 2 instructions, and
when nobody has more questions. Ranveig will then start
Part 2.
Ranveig gives a sign when all of the participants are
finished with Part 2, and the leaders continue reading
You have now finished Part 2 of the experiment. We will now collect the
instructions for Part 2.
SA1 collects the papers for Part 2. Leader waits till
SA1 has finished collecting the Part 2 instructions
9.5 Part 3
You will now be given the instructions for part 3. Please raise your hand if you
have any questions.
SA1 hands out Part 3 instructions
Anne-Mari gives a sign to Ranveig when the partici-
pants have finished reading the Part 3 instructions, and
when nobody has more questions. Ranveig will then start
Part 3.
Ranveig gives a sign when all of the participants are
finished with Part 3, and the leaders continue reading
You have now finished Part 3 of the experiment. We will now collect the
instructions for Part 3.
SA1 collects the papers for Part 3. Leader waits till
SA1 has finished collecting the Part 3 instructions
Appendix 8. Script
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9.6 Part 4
You will now be given the instructions for part 4. Please raise your hand if you
have any questions.
SA1 hands out Part 4 instructions
Anne-Mari gives a sign to Ranveig when the partici-
pants have finished reading the Part 4 instructions, and
when nobody has more questions. Ranveig will then start
Part 4.
Ranveig gives a sign when all of the participants are
finished with Part 4, and the leaders continue reading
You have now finished Part 4 of the experiment. We will now collect the
instructions for Part 4.
SA1 collects the papers for Part 4. Leader waits till
SA1 has finished collecting the Part 4 instructions
10 Questionnaire and payment
Short intro when the status page shows that everyone
has completed Part 4
All of you have now completed the last part of the experiment. The computer
will now calculate your payment from the experiment. While we wait for the
payments to be prepared, we should like to ask you to answer some questions.
Your answers to these questions will not in any way affect your payment. When
you have answered the questions, please remain seated for further instructions.
Please note that there are questions on both sides of the questionnaire.
SA1 hands out the questionnaire.
Leader waits until everyone has finished the ques-
tionnaire before reading. Ranveig and Anne-Mari have
to communicate here, so both rooms are ready before
starting at the same time.
Everyone has now answered all the questions. You will soon be given your
payments. You will also be given an overview of what you have earned in the
experiment. Please raise your hand if you have any questions regarding this the
overview or the payment. Again, while we wait, we ask you to remain quiet and
seated at your desk.
Appendix 8. Script
89
Leader waits until the envelopes arrives and the SA2
who has prepared them has left the room.
My assistant will now hand over the envelopes to you. He will do so by ap-
proaching your working stations one by one.
Before we proceed with the payments, let me take the opportunity to thank
you all for participating in this experiment. Your participation is valuable to
the research that we do. May we also ask you not to talk to anyone about the
experiment before the end of today, since we will conduct more session later
today. Thank you!
Appendix 8. Script
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Obs Mean SD Median Min Max
TATR 135 .539 .188 .5625 .0625 1
SELFISH 134 .775 .178 .7932105 .4599966 1
RISK 134 .765 .133 .763805 .4997005 1
EFFICIENCY 134 .726 .141 .7289553 .4705028 1
Appendix 9. Summarizing table and scatterplots of independent variables
Scatterplot SELFISH by participant ID
Scatterplot RISK by participant ID
Scatterplot EFFICIENCY by participant ID
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Appendix 10. OLS assumption testing
Normality
Distributional diagnostic plot
Quantiles of residuals against quantiles of normal distribution
Distributional diagnostic plot
Standardized normal probability plot
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Appendix 10. OLS assumption testing
Heteroscedasticity
Multicollinearity
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Appendix 10. OLS assumption testing
Linearity
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